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I. INTRODUCTION 
In eras of declining interest rates, millions of residential 
mortgage loans may be refinanced. When this occurs, it is customary 
for the refinancing lender to require a title examination and a new 
mortgagee’s title insurance policy. This requirement is expensive, 
usually costing several hundred dollars or more, and the cost is 
invariably paid by the borrower. This Article proposes that in the vast 
majority of refinancings this expense can be substantially reduced or 
even eliminated. This result can be achieved through proper 
understanding, adoption, and use of the doctrine of equitable 
mortgage subrogation articulated in the Restatement (Third) of 
Property: Mortgages.1 The principle of subrogation comes into play 
when the proceeds of a new mortgage are used to pay off a 
preexisting mortgage; it allows the holder of a new mortgage to take 
the priority of the old mortgage.2 If subrogation is made available 
liberally, as the Restatement recommends, it can eliminate the risk 
that intervening liens, arising between the dates of the original and 
the refinancing mortgages, will take priority over the refinancing 
 
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Professor Nelson expresses 
his appreciation to Benjamin F. Gardner and Phillip Lerch for their excellent research 
assistance. 
 ∗∗ James E. Campbell Missouri Endowed Professor of Law, University of Missouri-
Columbia. 
 1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES §§ 7.3, 7.6 (1997). 
 2. Priority is critical to mortgage lenders because, in the event of foreclosure, liens 
having higher priority are paid first out of the foreclosure proceeds. Hence, if an intervening 
lien, such as a judgment, a mechanic’s lien, or the like, acquires priority over the refinancing 
mortgage, the risk is increased that the foreclosure proceeds will be insufficient to pay the 
mortgage in full. See 1 GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 
§ 1.1 (4th ed. 2001). 
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mortgage. Hence, the need for new title insurance protection can be 
largely or entirely avoided. 
Part II of this Article3 describes the most recent wave of 
refinancings and estimates the costs involved in providing 
mortgagee’s title insurance. Part III4 focuses on traditional 
subrogation and related principles as they operate in the mortgage 
refinancing context and shows how the Restatement approach 
greatly reduces the risk of loss of mortgage priority for mortgage 
lenders. Part IV5 describes and advocates two simple changes to 
current residential mortgage documents that would greatly enhance 
their usefulness in the context of subrogation. Part V6 discusses the 
value that title insurance adds to a refinancing lender’s rights and 
considers whether, under a modern concept of mortgage 
subrogation, lenders might elect to forego their current requirement 
that title insurance be issued. Part VI7 describes how direct 
assignment of refinanced mortgages could serve as an alternative to 
subrogation and evaluates whether such a change in present practice 
is feasible. Part VII8 examines conditions in the mortgage and title 
insurance markets and argues that the pervasive adoption of the 
subrogation principle should either reduce title insurance premiums 
substantially in refinancings or, alternatively, cause major mortgage 
lenders to eliminate the need for title insurance completely. Finally, 
Part VIII9 considers whether state judicial adoption of the 
Restatement’s mortgage subrogation principles is the best course of 
action or whether Congress should enact the Restatement approach 
by legislation; we advocate the latter. Part IX offers a brief 
conclusion.  
II. THE COSTS OF REFINANCING 
Beginning in April 2002, the United States experienced an 
astonishing decline in residential mortgage interest rates. The thirty-
year fixed-rate mortgage, usually considered the standard or bell-
 
 3. See infra text accompanying notes 10–29. 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 30–79. 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 80–121. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 122–148. 
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 149–159. 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 160–195. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 196–201. 
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weather of the industry, had been near 7%10 since the beginning of 
2001.11 But in April 2002, it began a remarkable plunge,12 reaching 
a low of 5.21% in June 2003. It has remained near or below 6% to 
the present.13 Adjustable rate mortgages,14 which nearly always carry 
rates lower than fixed-rate loans, experienced a similar decline, falling 
to 4.5% in mid-2002 and ultimately reaching a low of 3.36% in 
March 2004; they remain just above 5% at this writing.15 
Some perspective on the extraordinary nature of these rate 
reductions is gained by considering the historic data on average new 
home mortgage yields published in the annual Economic Report of 
the President. Since the commencement of that data series in 1963, 
the lowest reported yield prior to 2000 was 5.81% in 1965—more 
than one-half of a percentage point higher than the June 2003 low.16 
 
 10. Data are based on the Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS). See 
http://www.freddiemac.com/dlink/html/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp?year=2006 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2006). The data are also available at Mortgage-X.com, National Average 
Mortgage Rates: Historical Data, http://mortgage-x.com/general/historical_rates.asp (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2006). Currently, 125 lenders across the nation—thrifts, commercial banks, 
and mortgage lending companies—are surveyed each week. Id. Rates given are for 
conventional financing on conforming mortgages with loan-to-value (LTV) rates of eighty 
percent or less. Id. The effect of points and fees charged by lenders is not included. The data 
are available from 1992 onward on a continuously-updated basis. Id.  
“Conforming” loans are those eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Id. 
The upper limit of conforming loans is adjusted annually by these two government-sponsored 
enterprises. For example, in 2000, the limit for single-family homes was $252,700. By 2005, it 
had been increased to $359,650. Id. 
 11. The 7% level was considered relatively low, but not unusual. Rates had fallen to the 
7% range in late 1993, in February 1996, and through the period from the beginning of 1998 
through mid-1999. Id. 
 12. The reduction in rates was primarily a product of the actions of the Federal Open 
Market Committee, an entity of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which 
controls U.S. monetary policy. Rates were reduced to stimulate the economy in the face of a 
recession that occurred in 2001. See James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, How Did Leading 
Indicator Forecasts Perform During the 2001 Recession?, 89 FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND 
ECON. Q. 71 (2003); Milton Marquis, Setting the Interest Rate, FRBSF ECON. LETTER 2002–
30, Oct. 11, 2002. 
 13. As of Feb. 16, 2006, the rate was 6.28%; this was the highest level it had reached 
since a brief peak of 6.29% in June 2004. See http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/ 
pmms30.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 14. The data reflect one-year adjustable rate mortgages indexed to constant maturity 
U.S. Treasury debt with a one-year maturity. 
 15. As of February 16, 2006, the rate was 5.17%, the highest it had been since January 
2002. See http://www.freddiemac.com/pmms/pmmsarm.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2006). 
 16. 2004 ECON. REP. OF THE PRESIDENT, at tbl.B-73, http://frwebgate2.access.gpo.gov/ 
cgi-bin/waisgate.cgi?WAISdocID=8527428750+3+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve. Because of 
variations in methods of data collection and computation over time, and because the historical 
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The inevitable result of these drastically lowered interest rates 
was a wave of residential mortgage refinancings that far eclipsed in 
number those of any previous period. Refinancing volume began 
accelerating in early 2001 and reached a sustained peak during April 
though June of 2003.17 Refinancings represented 55% of all one-to-
four-family mortgage loans in 2001, 59% in 2002, and 66% in 
2003.18  
The dollar amount of mortgage originations resulting from 
refinancing was also exceptional. During the three-year period from 
2001 through 2004, refinancing loans totaling about $5.4 trillion 
were originated.19 Given an average refinanced mortgage amount of 
$130,000,20 about 41 million home mortgage refinancings were 
originated during that period. If no households had refinanced more 
than once during 2001 through 2003, this figure would represent 
ninety-two percent of all homeowners with regular or home-equity 
mortgages.21 These figures indicate the massive size and volume of 
the recent refinancing activity.22 
This Article argues that the doctrine of subrogation, properly 
understood and applied, has the potential to eliminate or greatly 
reduce the expense of proof of title to mortgage lenders in 
refinancing transactions. If title expense had been lower, it is likely 
 
data in the Economic Report of the President are yields (incorporating the effect of points and 
fees) rather than promissory note rates, the historical data are not strictly comparable with the 
current Freddie Mac PMMS data. 
 17. The peak is graphically illustrated in John Robbins, Douglas G. Duncan & Jay 
Brinkman, Economic/Housing Outlook, Powerpoint Presentation given at 91st Annual MBA 
Convention, at 18 (Oct. 27, 2004), http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/ 
presentations/91st_annual/ConventionEconForecast10-27-04-Finalized.pdf. 
 18. See Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 1-to-4-Family Originations, 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/marketdata/data/03/1-4_originations.html (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2006). 
 19. See U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development, An Analysis of Mortgage 
Refinancing 2001–2003, Nov. 2004, at 2, http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/ 
MortgageRefinance03.pdf. 
 20. The average amount refinanced during 2001 and early 2002 was $128,800. We 
have adjusted the figure upward slightly to approximate inflation during 2002–03. See Glenn 
B. Canner et al., Mortgage Refinancing in 2001 and Early 2002, FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 2002, 
at 470 tbl.1, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2002/1202lead.pdf. 
 21. See Insurance Information Institute, Mortgage Finance and Housing, Financial 
Services Fact Book 2006, http://www.financialservicesfacts.org/financial2/mortgage/ 
mortgages/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2006) (indicating that in 2003, there were 
45,471,000 households that had regular or home-equity mortgages). 
 22. Because there were multiple refinancings by some households, these numbers 
overstate somewhat the number of households that refinanced. 
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that even more refinancings would have occurred during 2001–
2004, and refinancing would have been even more efficient and 
advantageous to those who did refinance. Hence, the estimation of 
size of the title expense is extremely useful. Undertaking such an 
estimation, however, is no easy task. Mortgage lenders almost always 
require a new title insurance policy, which the borrower pays before 
the borrower may refinance an existing loan.23 However, no national 
uniformity in title insurance methods or rates is currently in place. In 
many areas of the nation, title insurance is written by agents24 who 
also perform the necessary search of the records and charge an all-
inclusive rate. In other areas, attorneys or local companies act as title 
insurance agents and make a separate charge for their services in 
examining the records. Rates tend to be similar among title 
companies in a given locality but vary widely throughout the nation. 
There is no national database of title insurance rates. 
The issue is further complicated by many title companies’ use of 
reissue rates. A reissue rate is a discounted rate that is made available 
if the same title company has previously issued a policy on the same 
property during a fixed time period, usually five or ten years. The 
discount may reduce the insurance premium forty to sixty percent of 
the standard rate.25 Title underwriters’ approaches to the concept of 
the reissue rate vary widely, and consumers are sometimes unaware 
that such reissue rates are even available. Therefore, consumers often 
do not receive the benefit of reissue rates.26 
Despite these variations, it is possible to make a reasonable 
estimate of the title insurance cost for a new loan policy issued in 
connection with a residential mortgage refinancing. Where an all-
 
 23. Charles Kovaleski, Should You Refinance?, ALTA, http://www.alta.org/consumer/ 
refinance.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006) (“When you refinance your home, you are in effect 
taking out a new loan. Your lender is going to require that you purchase lender’s title 
insurance to protect their investment.”); see also Fannie Mae, Refinancing: Requirements & 
Costs, http://www.fanniemae.com/homebuyers/findamortgage/refinancing/requirements 
.html (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
 24. The agent represents the underwriter, which is actually the entity that issues the 
insurance policy. 
 25. See Kenneth R. Harney, It’s Homeowners vs. Title Insurers, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 
2001, available at http://www.radianexpress.com/RadianExpress/pdf/radian_lien_la_times.pdf; 
Kenneth R. Harney, Refinancing’s Magic Words: Reissue Rate, WASH. POST, June 8, 2002, at 
H01. 
 26. See Kenneth R. Harney, Title Insurance "Reissue Rates" Spark Class Action Suits, 
Controversy, REALTY TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/ 
20030414_reissuerates.htm. 
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inclusive rate is available, our estimate of the cost for an average 
$130,000 refinancing is approximately $400.27 Given the roughly 41 
million residential refinancings during 2001–2003, the amount spent 
on title services protecting refinancing lenders was approximately an 
astounding $16 billion. This sum was, from the viewpoint of 
consumers, a deadweight loss because consumers have no 
independent need or desire for a new title insurance policy when 
refinancing. The expenditure is merely a costly condition of 
obtaining the new loan. Even from the lender’s viewpoint, the 
 
 27. One national title insurance underwriter, First American Title Ins. Co., provides an 
Internet calculator that can be used to determine premium rates. See Firstam.com, 
http://titlefees.firstam.com/Titlefees.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). The following rates were 
calculated from that web site on the basis of a loan of $130,000 refinancing a previous loan 
made five years earlier, and having a current balance of $130,000 to eliminate taking cash from 
the refinancing. The calculator examines reissue discounts where available. 
All-inclusive rate states (sample): 
Arizona (Maricopa County) ..................................................................................$541 
California (Los Angeles County) ...........................................................................$360 
Illinois .................................................................................................................$330 
Michigan (Wayne County)....................................................................................$337 
New York (Westchester County)...........................................................................$382 
Nevada (Clark County).........................................................................................$279 
Oregon ................................................................................................................$689 
Utah ....................................................................................................................$471 
Washington (King County)...................................................................................$313 
Average of the foregoing ......................................................................................$411 
States in which a search fee is separately charged: 
Florida .................................................................................................................$362 
Massachussetts .....................................................................................................$195 
Minnesota............................................................................................................$161 
Missouri...............................................................................................................$166 
Ohio....................................................................................................................$364 
Average of the foregoing ......................................................................................$250 
The average rate of the “separate search fee” states has little meaning because there is no basis 
for determining the additional search fee. However, it seems to be at least $150 on average. 
The estimate in the text is borne out by LendingTree.com, an Internet mortgage loan 
service, whose web site gives an overall national estimate of $450 to $600. See Lending Tree, 
Costs of Refinancing, http://www.lendingtree.com/stmrc/refiarticle5.asp?bp= (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2006); Pete Boisseau, Radian Continues To Spread Incorrect Cost-Savings, 81 TITLE 
NEWS, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 9 (criticizing the lien-impairment guaranty offered by Radian 
Group, Inc. as an alternative to title insurance). The author notes that, “[o]n a $100,000 loan, 
true title insurance would cost less than Radian’s $325 flat rate in 36 states. On a $150,000 
loan, title insurance would be less expensive in 28 states.” Id. 
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expenditure was largely unnecessary and a significant drag on the 
economic benefit refinancing generated. 
This analysis suggests that title assurance costs for refinancing 
residential mortgages are very significant. Of course, residential 
mortgages are only part of the story—loans on commercial, 
industrial, and agricultural property are also refinanced as interest 
rates fall. While restrictions and fees on prepayment impede 
refinancing such loans to a much greater extent than with respect to 
residential loans,28 nonresidential refinancings are still quite 
common. These loans are typically much larger than residential loans 
and are thus tied to correspondingly higher title assurance costs. 
Title assurance costs act as an impediment to refinancings. In 
some cases, they impede enough to cause a mortgagor to forego 
refinancing altogether in the hope that a further reduction in interest 
rates will make the transaction more worthwhile in the future. In 
other cases, the refinancing transaction may still go forward, but the 
economic benefit to the mortgagor is lessened by the title assurance 
expense. In general, the cost of title assurance, like all transaction 
costs, makes the overall transaction less efficient.29 
The question we address here is simple: is there a feasible way to 
reduce the cost of title assurance in mortgage refinancings? We 
believe that the answer is yes, and suggest a simple change in the 
law—a change that would harm no one and that is already in effect 
in a few states—that would drastically reduce the cost of assuring 
refinancing lenders they are receiving mortgages with the priority 
they expect and desire. This change involves the doctrine of 
mortgage subrogation and its related principles. 
III. APPLYING SUBROGATION PRINCIPLES TO 
MORTGAGE REFINANCINGS 
A mortgagor who seeks to refinance may obtain the new loan 
either from the same lender that made the existing loan or from a 
different lender altogether. This choice is important for our purposes 
 
 28. See Dale A. Whitman, Mortgage Prepayment Clauses: An Economic and Legal 
Analysis, 40 UCLA L. REV. 851, 851–52 (1993); Joe Mattey, Mortgage Interest Rates, 
Valuation, and Prepayment Risk, FRBSF ECON. LETTER 98–30, Oct. 9, 1998, available at 
http://www.sf.frb.org/econrsrch/wklyltr/wklyltr98/el98-30.html (noting that the vast 
majority of residential mortgages are freely prepayable). 
 29. Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937), http://people.bu.edu/vaguirre/ 
courses/bu332/nature_firm.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
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because traditional subrogation doctrine applies when using a 
different lender. Different principles, albeit “subrogation-like,” 
would govern in the former situation.30 Because refinancing by a new 
lender is more frequent31 and is governed by pure subrogation rules, 
we focus first on such a transaction. 
A. Refinancing by a New Lender 
The concept of subrogation in mortgage law is simple: “One 
who fully performs an obligation of another, secured by a mortgage, 
becomes by subrogation the owner of the obligation and the 
mortgage to the extent necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.”32 
Thus, subrogation amounts to an assignment, by operation of law, of 
the obligation and the mortgage to the subrogee. To see how this 
concept can be applied to a refinancing, assume a homeowner-
mortgagor currently has a fixed rate mortgage loan on her house 
with a $200,000 balance that is held by a bank. Because market 
interest rates have declined since the loan was obtained, the owner 
decides to refinance the balance with a different bank. The typical 
mechanics of such a transaction include the following: The 
mortgagor will execute a new promissory note and mortgage in favor 
of the new bank, and the proceeds of the new loan will be used to 
pay off the balance at the old bank. The old bank will then cancel the 
mortgagor’s original note and record a discharge of the mortgage. 
The new bank’s mortgage will be recorded concurrently and the new 
bank will receive a title insurance policy insuring that it has a senior 
mortgage on the property. The homeowner-mortgagor will pay the 
title insurance premium. 
The title insurer’s primary task in this transaction is to insure that 
no intervening liens or other interests in the property have been 
created since the original mortgage was recorded because such 
interests might acquire priority over the new mortgage.33 The 
 
 30. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 31. See Michael D. Larson, Refinancing: New Rate, New Rules, 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/loan/20010106a.asp (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
 32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(a) (1997). 
 33. For example, you may have taken out a second mortgage on the home that could 
threaten the priority of the new lender’s mortgage. Or, there could be legal judgments against 
you or a mechanic’s lien against the property by a supplier who was not paid for home 
improvements. Chi. Title Ins. Co., Why Title Insurance Is Needed when Refinancing a 
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doctrine of subrogation can be used to reduce or eliminate the title 
insurance company’s risk in this transaction. 
For our purposes, the branch of subrogation theory that is of 
interest involves one who pays off the debt of another because the 
person making the payment is requested by the debtor to do so.34 
This is precisely what happens in the typical mortgage refinancing—
the mortgagor requests the refinancing lender, the second bank—to 
pay off the prior mortgage loan, which is commonly a first mortgage. 
In conventional thinking, this discharges the prior mortgage, leaving 
the refinancing lender’s mortgage as the new first mortgage. Of 
course, this result is assumed to follow only if no intervening liens or 
other interests in the land exist in priority between the old and new 
mortgages. If intervening interests do exist, the refinancing lender is 
concerned that if the prior mortgage is paid, these interests will be 
promoted in priority and will trump the refinancing mortgage. As a 
means of self protection, the refinancing lender orders a title 
examination and a new title insurance policy, at the expense of the 
borrower, to ensure that no such intervening interests exist. If the 
old mortgage can be assigned by operation of law to the refinancing 
lender, intervening liens or other interests become far less 
threatening for the refinancing lender, if not completely irrelevant.35 
In such a scenario, those liens will remain subordinate to the 
refinanced mortgage because the refinancing mortgagee will 
“inherit” the priority of the mortgage being paid off. Hence a 
refinancing lender who could be assured of the benefits of 
subrogation would put pressure on title insurance companies to 
reduce their premium rates or even eliminate the title insurance 
 
Mortgage Loan?, http://www.titleinsuranceny.com/brochure/cons_info_4419.html (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
 34. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997). 
 35. Junior liens, despite their lack of priority, do present some disadvantages to senior 
mortgagees. See Joshua Stein, Subordinate Mortgage Financing: The Perils of the Senior Lender, 
REAL EST. REV., Fall 1997, http://www.real-estate-law.com/articles/subordinate_mortgage 
.htm. These disadvantages are relatively minor, particularly in the context of residential 
financing, and would not likely cause the refinancing lender to refuse to fund the loan. The 
chief disadvantage is that a junior lien may impose on the borrower an additional monthly cash 
outflow obligation, straining the borrower’s limited resources and increasing the probability of 
a default. Id. However, refinancing lenders can (and generally do) require borrowers to 
complete loan application forms that identify, or negate the existence of, such junior liens. A 
sworn affidavit on the point might be required as additional protection for the lender. 
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requirement, thus allowing the lender to offer refinancing to 
prospective customers at a lower total cost to them.36 
Under what conditions is subrogation to the prior mortgage 
available to a refinancing lender? The answer is controversial and may 
depend on the nature and extent of the refinancing lender’s 
knowledge or notice of the existence of intervening liens. The 
Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages takes a very expansive 
view of the application of the subrogation principle. The 
Restatement holds that the refinancing lender should be entitled to 
subrogation even if it had actual knowledge of a junior lien, if it 
“reasonably expected to receive a security interest in the real estate 
with the priority of the mortgage being discharged, and if 
subrogation will not materially prejudice the holders of intervening 
interests in the real estate.”37 Moreover, “[a] refinancing mortgagee 
should be found to lack such an expectation only where there is 
affirmative proof that the mortgagee intended to subordinate its 
mortgage to the intervening interest.”38 In recent years, a significant 
number of courts have adopted the Restatement or followed its 
logic.39 
Some courts are more conservative than the Restatement 
approach in recognizing subrogation. One group, probably the 
majority of all courts nationally, refuses subrogation if the payor had 
 
 36. See infra text accompanying notes 160–195. 
 37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP. : MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4)(1997). 
 38. Id. § 7.6 cmt. e; see also id. illus. 27. 
 39. Cases adopting the Restatement approach include Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase 
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 95 P.3d 542 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004); E. Sav. Bank v. Pappas, 829 
A.2d 953 (D.C. 2003) (dictum); Wilkins v. Gibson, 38 S.E. 374 (Ga. 1901); Bank of N.Y. v. 
Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. 2005); Klotz v. Klotz, 440 N.W.2d 406 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); 
E. Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1998); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 
S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Houston v. Bank of Am., 78 P.3d 71 (Nev. 2003); 
Providence Inst. for Sav. v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969); Farm Credit Bank v. Ogden, 
886 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App. 1994); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawrence Invs., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 
332 (Tex. App. 1989); see also Trus Joist Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983), rev’d sub nom., Trus Joist Corp. v. Treetop Assocs., 477 
A.2d 817 (N.J. 1984). Several intermediate appellate courts have expressed approval of the 
Restatement approach, but have declined to apply it because they considered themselves 
bound by earlier state supreme court decisions that were less favorable to subrogation. See 
Ripley v. Piehl, 700 N.W.2d 540 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 
863 A.2d 1153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004); Bank of Am. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 109 P.3d 863 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2005). The Colorado Supreme Court came close to adopting the 
Restatement view in Hicks v. Londre, 125 P.3d 452 (Colo. 2005), but indicated that it might 
deny subrogation if the refinancing lender was a sophisticated commercial lender with actual 
knowledge of the intervening interest. 
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actual knowledge of the intervening interest, but allows subrogation 
if the payor’s only notice was constructive from the recordation of 
the intervening interest.40 This approach places a premium on 
ignorance—not such a bad thing in the present context. If the 
refinancing lender can preserve the right to subrogation by avoiding 
knowledge (e.g., by refraining from obtaining a title examination), 
then refraining from examining the title is an entirely rational step 
and has the added advantage of saving money. 
In addition to the Restatement approach and the more 
conservative approach that permits subrogation unless the 
refinancing lender had actual knowledge of the intervening lien, 
there is a third approach, which is the most hostile to the refinancing 
lender. It denies subrogation even if the payor’s only knowledge of 
the intervening interest was constructive notice from the recording 
of that interest.41 We have vigorously criticized this approach42 and 
 
 40. See Vogel v. Veneman, 276 F.3d 729 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Texas law); United 
States v. Baran, 996 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying New York law); Han v. United States, 
944 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1991) (applying California law); United States v. Hughes, 499 F.2d 
322 (8th Cir. 1974) (applying Arkansas law); Burgoon v. Lavezzo, 92 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 
1937); Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Grissett, 500 F. Supp. 159 (M.D. Ala. 1980); United 
States v. Fagin, 252 B.R. 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000) (applying Texas law); In re Hubbard, 
89 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1988); Herberman v. Bergstrom, 816 P.2d 244 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991); Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Feldsher, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 542 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Smith 
v. State Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 298 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Pappas, 829 A.2d 953 
(adopting the Restatement in dictum, but actually holding merely that constructive notice to 
the refinancing lender would not bar its subrogation claim); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. First Sec. 
Bank, 491 P.2d 1261 (Idaho 1971); La. Nat’l Bank v. Belello, 577 So. 2d 1099 (La. Ct. App. 
1991); United Carolina Bank v. Beesley, 663 A.2d 574 (Me. 1995); Metrobank for Sav. v. 
Nat’l Cmty. Bank, 620 A.2d 433 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Gerenstein v. Williams, 
723 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001); Home Title Guar. Co. v. Carey, 144 N.Y.S.2d 116 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170 (Or. 1989); Pee Dee State Bank v. 
Prosser, 367 S.E.2d 708 (S.C. Ct. App. 1988), overruled by United Carolina Bank v. 
Caroprop, Ltd., 446 S.E.2d 415 (S.C. 1994); Pierner v. Computer Res. & Tech., Inc., 1998 
WL 51496 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (unpublished opinion). 
 41. See In re Gordon, 164 B.R. 706 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994) (applying Florida law); 
Indep. One Mortgage Corp. v. Katsaros, 681 A.2d 1005 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996); Hieber v. 
Fla. Nat’l Bank, 522 So. 2d 878 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Bank of Canton v. Nelson, 160 
S.E. 232 (Ga. 1931); Harms v. Burt, 40 P.3d 329 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002); Thompson v. Chase 
Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 90 S.W.3d 194 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Metmor Fin., Inc. v. 
Landoll Corp., 976 S.W.2d 454 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Barnes, 
623 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Harmon, 2002 WL 
1980705 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (unpublished opinion); Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. N. Am. 
Mortgage Co., 559 S.E.2d 870 (Va. 2002); Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665 (Wash. 2001), modified, 
43 P.3d 1222 (Wash. 2001); see also Belcher v. Belcher, 87 P.2d 762 (Or. 1939). The 
continuing vitality of Belcher v. Belcher is uncertain in light of Rusher v. Bunker, 782 P.2d 170 
(Or. Ct. App. 1989), which refused to bar subrogation where the payor had only constructive 
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find it impossible to understand in light of the fact that subrogation 
in this situation harms no one, leaving the intervening lien exactly 
where it started. In contrast, refusal to grant subrogation gives the 
intervening lienor an unexpected, unearned, and unwarranted 
promotion in priority.43 
This last approach, in effect, forces the refinancing lender to 
obtain new title insurance,44 and it casts the loss on the refinancing 
lender in the first instance if no title insurance is issued or is issued in 
 
notice of the intervening lien. See Dimeo v. Gesik, 993 P.2d 183 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) 
(declining to resolve the issue on summary judgment). The position of the Kansas courts is also 
in doubt as a result of the holding in National City Mortgage Co. v. Ross, 117 P.3d 880 (Kan. 
Ct. App. 2005), granting subrogation even though the refinancing lender had constructive 
notice of the intervening interest (a purchaser’s interest in a real estate installment contract) by 
virtue of the possession of the contract purchasers. 
Michigan appears to be alone in denying subrogation on the ground that a refinancing 
lender is a “mere volunteer,” since it has no legal obligation to pay off the prior mortgage. See 
Wash. Mut. Bank v. ShoreBank Corp., 703 N.W.2d 486 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005). This position 
disregards the widely held understanding that subrogation can be granted to one who pays a 
debt at the request of the debtor, as a refinancing lender obviously does. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997). 
 42. See 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 10.6, at 802. 
 43. Exceptional situations can arise in which subrogation would be unjust to the 
intervening lienor, but they arise only when the parties depart from normal procedure. For 
example, in Bankers Trust Co. v. Collins, 124 S.W.3d 576 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003), a lender 
made a loan to refinance a prior recorded mortgage, but the refinancing mortgage was not 
recorded. Subsequently, a different mortgagee made a loan on the property with no notice of 
the prior unrecorded mortgage. Since the later mortgagee was a bona fide purchaser, it was 
held to have priority over the unrecorded loan on the basis of the recording act. Id. at 578–79. 
The holder of the unrecorded mortgage attempted to defeat this argument by asserting that it 
was subrogated to the (recorded) mortgage it had paid off. The court correctly rejected this 
argument. Id. at 579–80. Since the original mortgage that had been refinanced was discharged 
of record, and the refinancing mortgage was unrecorded, it would have been unjust to grant it 
priority over the bona fide purchaser. Id. at 579. In re Lewis, 270 B.R. 215 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich. 2001), is similar, except that it involved the strong-arm rights of a trustee in bankruptcy 
rather than an actual intervening lienor. 
The same sort of problem can arise if the original mortgage is discharged of record but a 
delay occurs in recording the refinancing mortgage. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. f, illus. 30 (1997). However, this is an extremely rare situation. The 
usual case is just the opposite: the new mortgage is recorded immediately after closing, while 
the discharge of the old mortgage is not recorded for several weeks or months. See UNIFORM 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SATISFACTION ACT, Prefatory Note (2004), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/umsa/2004finalact.pdf (holding that a refinancing 
mortgagee was not entitled to subrogation where it made no title examination before making 
its loan). 
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error. Of course, if a new title policy is in fact obtained, as is usually 
the case, the ultimate loss if the title examination fails to identify an 
intervening lien falls on the title insurance underwriter. Indeed, a 
number of the decisions in this category seem to be motivated by 
nothing less than undisguised hostility to the title insurance 
industry.45 They express the view that, if the title insurer makes a 
search error, it ought to pay for it even when the payment is merely 
compensation for giving the intervening lienor the unearned 
promotion in priority mentioned above. This attitude is inexplicable. 
It makes no more sense to deny subrogation to a title insurer here 
than it would to deny a fire insurer subrogation against an arsonist or 
to deny a liability insurer subrogation against a tortfeasor. Insurers, 
after all, are not simply vast reservoirs of free money. They pay claims 
out of the premiums paid by their insureds, and if they are forced to 
pay unnecessary claims, the competitive forces of the insurance 
market will inevitably drive their premiums upward, making 
settlement costs higher for all mortgagors. There is simply no reason 
to impose on consumers the cost of giving windfall promotions of 
priority to junior lienholders. 
 
 45. The following passages indicate this hostility: 
Another factor in our determination, and one which [the refinancing lender] urges 
us to ignore, is whether a title insurer had an opportunity to review the title and find 
the recorded judgment lien. That a title insurer was paid to perform precisely the 
function that would have revealed the [intervening] judgment lien is a factor within 
the purview of a determination of the equities. 
Wilshire Servicing Corp. v. Timber Ridge P’ship, 743 N.E.2d 1173, 1179–80 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2001). 
Under a contractual obligation, [the title insurance company] was negligent in 
giving its expert opinion and insuring title. The doctrine of subrogation does not 
apply to relieve a title insurance company of its contractual obligation because a title 
insurance company not only receives consideration for rendering an expert opinion, 
but also for acting as an insurer of its accuracy. [The company] failed to discover a 
recorded and perfected judgment lien and upon receiving actual notice, failed to 
disclose or remedy the situation. 
Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665, 672 (Wash. 2001) (citation omitted), modified, 43 P.3d 1222 
(Wash. 2001). 
[A]ny “windfall” in this case as a result of granting subrogation would inure to the 
benefit of the negligent title examiner and the party that insured the title for [the 
refinancing lender and purchasers]. While [they] have recourse against those parties 
for the loss in this case, [the intervening lienor] has no such recourse. 
Centreville Car Care, Inc. v. N. Am. Mortgage Co., 559 S.E.2d 870, 874 (Va. 2002); see also 
Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank, 792 So. 2d 1222, 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) 
(Stone, J., dissenting). 
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B. Avoiding Material Prejudice to Intervening Interests 
As noted above, all courts deny subrogation to the refinancing 
lender to the extent that subrogation would result in “material 
prejudice” to intervening interests.46 Here we consider how such 
material prejudice might arise and what its impact might be. When a 
mortgage is refinanced, the parties often modify some of the loan 
terms. The most common changes are an increase in the loan’s 
balance (often known as a “cash-out” refinancing) and an increase in 
the term to maturity. A third type of modification, also fairly 
frequent, is a change from an adjustable interest rate to a fixed rate. 
The purpose of this Section is to evaluate whether such 
modifications represent “material prejudice” and the impact that 
such changes are likely to have on a mortgage’s priority in relation to 
junior liens. 
Cash-out residential refinancings have become increasingly 
common over the past decade.47 Federal Reserve Board survey data 
indicate that in 1994 only about 25% of refinancing homeowners 
increased their loan balances; in 1998 and 1999 about 35% did so.48 
By 2001–2002 the proportion of cash-out refinancings had risen to 
45%.49 Data for loans refinanced by Freddie Mac50 indicate a peak in 
cash-outs during 2000, with some reduction since that time and an 
overall cash-out rate for the 1999–2004 period of about 56%.51 
 
 46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4). 
 47. The risks to borrowers of “cash-out” refinancing are discussed in William R. 
Emmons, Consumer-Finance Myths and Other Obstacles to Financial Literacy, Dec. 8, 2004 
(unpublished paper presented at the St. Louis University School of Law), 
http://law.slu.edu/conf/lending/docs/Emmons_lending_Conference04.pdf.  
 48. Peter J. Brady et al., The Effects of Recent Mortgage Refinancing, FED. RES. BULL., 
July 2000, at 441, 445. 
 49. Canner et al., supra note 20, at 469, 472. 
 50. Freddie Mac, one of the two federally chartered secondary mortgage-market 
purchasers, defines a cash-out refinance as one in which the balance of the loan is increased by 
more than 5%. This definition recognizes that many homeowners need to borrow enough, 
over and above their preexisting loan balances, to cover the settlement costs of the refinancing. 
An increase of 5% in loan balance will typically permit the mortgagor to recover little or no 
actual cash for other purposes. 
 51. Averaging the percentage of quarterly cash-out refinancings reported by Freddie 
Mac from 1999 through 2004 yields the following percentages: 1999: 64%; 2000: 79%; 2001: 
55%; 2002: 52%; 2003: 38%; 2004: 50%. See News Release, Freddie Mac, Cash-out Refinance 
Share Falls Modestly in Fourth Quarter 2004, Feb. 1, 2005, http://www.freddiemac.com/ 
news/archives/rates/2005/4qupb04.html.  
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Cash-out refinancings are potentially problematic in terms of the 
“material prejudice to junior lienors” test mentioned above.52 If we 
assume that under the operation of the subrogation doctrine 
discussed above, the priority of the original mortgage will be 
available to the refinancing lender, an increase in the balance owing 
on the loan may be harmful to the interests of the junior lienors. As 
the Restatement points out: 
Subrogation will be recognized only if it will not materially 
prejudice the holders of intervening interests. The most obvious 
illustration is that of a [lender] who lends the mortgagor more 
money than is necessary to discharge the preexisting mortgage. The 
[lender] is subrogated only to the extent that the funds disbursed 
are actually applied toward payment of the prior lien. There is no 
right of subrogation with respect to any excess funds.53 
There can be no serious doubt that a higher loan balance, or an 
increased interest rate that results in a slower reduction in the loan 
balance (so that at any given future date, the loan will have a higher 
balance than would have been the case under its original 
amortization schedule), prejudices the positions of any intervening 
interest-holders.54 The increase in balance on the prior mortgage 
 
 52. See supra text accompanying note 35. 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1997). 
 54. See Shane v. Winter Hill Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 492 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. 1986) 
(finding that an interest rate increase in excess of the 1% “default interest kickup” provided for 
in the original mortgage documents was prejudicial to junior mortgagee and hence not 
binding upon it); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that 
extensions of time for payment did not materially prejudice an intervening lienor but that 
additions of various fees to the mortgage balance and inclusion of cross-default clause did 
cause prejudice, and should therefore be denied priority pro tanto as against the intervening 
lien); Fleet Bank of N.Y. v. County of Monroe Indus. Dev. Agency, 637 N.Y.S.2d 870 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1996) (agreeing with the Restatement test and finding that a material issue of fact 
existed as to material prejudice); Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Ass’n, 594 N.Y.S.2d 890 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (finding that an increase in interest rate materially prejudiced the 
intervening lienor but that a pro tanto loss of priority of the senior mortgage, to the extent that 
the higher interest resulted in a higher loan balance, was the appropriate remedy); Mergener v. 
Fuhr, 208 N.W. 267 (Wis. 1926) (holding that an increase in interest rate would result in a pro 
tanto loss of priority of the senior mortgage to an intervening lien). 
Courts sometimes suggest that the prejudice may be so substantial as to warrant complete 
rather than a pro tanto loss in priority. “This sanction may be called for where the increase in 
the senior mortgage obligation is so substantial that no equity whatsoever remains to secure 
junior liens.” 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 802. But see E. Sav. Bank v. Pappas, 
829 A.2d 953 (D.C. 2003) (concluding that even a substantial interest rate increase did not 
result in material prejudice to the junior lienors); Dorothy Edwards Realtors, Inc. v. McAdams, 
525 N.E.2d 1249 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a mortgage modification deferring some 
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places them farther down the “food chain,” and, if foreclosure 
becomes necessary, their probability of recovering their debts out of 
the property is reduced. The scenario of the increased rate is not 
particularly relevant here because mortgagors ordinarily refinance to 
get lower interest rates, not higher ones,55 and a lowered rate is 
obviously advantageous to intervening lienors. But an increased loan 
balance plainly represents an increased exposure to risk to the 
intervening lienholders.  
We need to consider how much additional money is typically 
involved. Federal Reserve Board data for residential refinancings in 
2001–2002 indicates that, for mortgagors taking cash out by 
refinancing,56 the mean loan balance before refinancing was nearly 
$125,931. The amount of new cash raised by the refinancing57 had a 
mean of $26,723 and a median of $18,500.58 Remarkably, even after 
the refinancing, the loans in the survey had loan-to-value ratios of 
only 62.9% (mean) or 65% (median)59—levels perceived as having 
very low default risk by the residential mortgage industry.60 
 
payments and increasing the interest rate did not prejudice an intervening lienor). But see 
American General Financial Services, Inc. v. Barnes, 623 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006), in 
which the court flatly denied subrogation, in part because the borrowers had drawn down an 
additional $1,573 in addition to paying off about $114,000 on two prior deeds of trust. It 
seems not to have occurred to the court to grant pro tanto subrogation. 
 55. Averaging the quarterly ratios of old to new interest rates reported by Freddie Mac 
from 2001 through 2004 yields an overall average ratio of 1.19 to 1. See News Release, 
Freddie Mac, Cash-out Refinance Share Falls Modestly in Fourth Quarter 2004, Feb. 1, 2005, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/news/archives/rates/2005/4qupb04.html. Stated differently, 
the average residential mortgagor was able to reduce his or her interest rate by about 16% by 
refinancing. Federal Reserve Board data for 2001–2002 indicate that 96% of mortgagors who 
refinanced during this period obtained lower interest rates, with an average reduction of 1.83 
percentage points. See Canner et al., supra note 20, at 471. 
 56. The Federal Reserve Board data is based on a definition of “cash out” as any new 
loan having a balance exceeding the amount due on the preexisting loan plus closing costs. See 
Canner et al., supra note 20, at 473 tbl.7. 
 57. Note that this full amount did not necessarily become available to the mortgagors 
for other expenditures since some portion of it was inevitably eaten up by title insurance, loan 
fees, appraisal fees, and other expenses of refinancing. 
 58. See Canner et al., supra note 20, at 473. 
 59. Id. 
 60. It has long been recognized that loan-to-value ratio is a very strong—perhaps the 
best—predictor of the probability of mortgage default. See, e.g., Carl E. Case & Robert J. 
Shiller, Mortgage Default Risk and Real Estate Prices: The Use of Index-Based Futures and 
Options in Real Estate, 7 J. HOUSING RES. 243, 245 (1996) (“Strong evidence . . . shows that 
the best single predictor of default is the current ratio of loan to market value for each 
property.”). Lower loan-to-value ratios produce lower default rates because (1) borrowers with 
larger equities have more to lose when a default occurs, and consequently try harder to avoid 
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The impact of the additional loan balance is likely to be far less 
than at first appears. The refinancing mortgagee in the average 
transaction described above would have a loan balance of $152,654 
but mortgage priority and title insurance coverage of only 
$125,931—a shortfall of about 17.5% of the total loan amount. This 
may initially seem to be a serious deficiency, but two factors must be 
remembered. First, the low loan-to-value ratio makes a default in 
payment by the mortgagor very unlikely. Second, even if the loan-to-
value ratio were significantly higher, the fact that the subrogation 
doctrine confers mortgage priority on 82.5% of the new loan balance 
might still be a sufficient incentive to a title insurer to cover the 
entire new loan balance at a significantly reduced rate. 
Refinancing loans also commonly provide for longer 
amortization periods than the loans they replace. However, it is 
highly unlikely that “stretching out” the term for payment of the 
loan would be considered “materially prejudicial” to intervening 
junior interests.61 Usually “courts assume that extensions of maturity 
reduce the likelihood of foreclosure of the senior mortgage and 
hence that they are helpful, rather than prejudicial, to the interests of 
junior lienors.”62 There is a “strong presumption” against finding 
prejudice in this context.63 Except in extreme cases,64 we agree with 
this view. 
 
default; and (2) borrowers with larger equities are more likely, when faced with a financial 
crisis, to be able to sell the property and realize a positive net cash return after paying 
transaction costs and the mortgage balance. 
 61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 cmt. c (1997) takes the view 
in a related context that “[a]bsent an increase in the principal amount or the interest rate of 
the mortgage, such modifications normally do not jeopardize the mortgagee’s priority as 
against intervening interests. . . . Extensions of maturity generally reduce the likelihood of 
foreclosure of the senior mortgage and thus are beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to the 
interests of junior lienors.” Cases that agree with this position include Shultis v. Woodstock 
Land Development Associates., 594 N.Y.S.2d 890, 892 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993), and Lennar 
Northeastern Partners v. Buice, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435, 442–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).  
  This position is not beyond debate. An increase in maturity may well reduce the 
monthly cash obligations of the borrower, making default less likely, but it also means that the 
loan will amortize more slowly, and, hence, will have a higher balance at any given point in 
time before it is fully paid. The higher balance is obviously detrimental to junior lienors if a 
foreclosure of the senior mortgage occurs. The courts have usually disregarded this factor, or 
have assumed that the detriment is outweighed by the benefit of the lower probability of 
default. See Shultis, 594 N.Y.S.2d 890; Lennar Ne. Partners, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 cmt. c and Reporter’s Note (1997). 
 62. 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 800. 
 63. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 cmt. b. 
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Of course, changes in maturity as a result of refinancing can go 
in either direction. During the past several years a common form of 
refinancing has involved shortening, rather than lengthening, the 
maturity of the earlier loan. For example, the refinancing loan may 
have a fifteen-year amortization, while the loan being paid off was for 
a thirty-year term. Even though such transactions almost always 
result in a significantly lower interest rate, the shorter amortization 
period sometimes means that the monthly payments will actually 
increase. Of course, the borrower will need to be satisfied with his or 
her own ability to make the higher payments, and the refinancing 
lender will ordinarily insist on qualifying the borrower by examining 
his or her ability to do so.65 
From the viewpoint of the junior lien-holder, the refinancing of a 
senior mortgage loan with a shorter term than the original senior 
mortgage represents both good news and bad news. The good news 
is that the senior debt will be discharged more rapidly and ultimately 
be paid in full earlier than if the refinancing had not occurred. The 
 
 64. Such an “extreme case” arguably existed in Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665 (Wash. 2001), 
modified, 43 P.3d 1222 (Wash. 2001), in which the original mortgage loan had a six-year 
maturity but was refinanced with a loan having a thirty-year maturity (but a much lower 
interest rate). The court found that the extension of the loan term prejudiced the junior lienor, 
who held a judgment lien. Id. at 669. The original loan had a fifteen-year amortization 
schedule with a balloon payment due after six years, while the refinancing loan (made three 
years and four months later) had a thirty-year amortization schedule and no balloon payment. 
Hence, the new loan amortized more slowly than the old one; under the original loan terms, 
the loan would have had a balance of $100,134 at the time of the balloon payoff in January 
2002, while the new loan would have had a balance of $115,807 on that date. On the other 
hand, because of the interest rate reduction (from 10.5% to 6.75%), the borrower’s monthly 
payment was reduced nearly one-half, from $1,437 to $785. 
It is not easy to say whether the change in loan terms was prejudicial to the judgment 
lienholder. If the borrowers defaulted on the new loan during the period prior to the old 
loan’s balloon maturity, and the new loan was foreclosed, the judgment lienholder would have 
realized less money after the senior mortgage was paid—potentially as much as $15,000 less, 
depending on the date of foreclosure. However, the probability of a default by the borrowers 
was surely reduced significantly by the huge reduction in their monthly payment. It is simply 
unclear to which mortgage, the old or the new one, the judgment lienor would have preferred 
to be subordinate. 
 65. A common method of qualification requires proof that the monthly payments will 
not exceed a given percentage of the borrower’s household income. That percentage will 
usually be in the range of 28% to 33%, depending on the particular lender’s policies. An 
additional “total expense ratio” test, often applied, requires proof that the combination of the 
borrower’s mortgage payment and all other monthly debt payments not exceed a percentage, 
typically 33% to 41%, of the borrower’s household income. See Jack M. Guttentag, Qualifying 
for a Mortgage, Dec. 12, 2000, http://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Qualifying/ 
qualifying_for_a_mortgage.htm. 
1NELSON.FIN 9/5/2006 11:48 AM 
305] Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation Principles 
 323 
bad news is that the borrower may have a larger monthly obligation 
to meet, thus increasing the borrower’s financial stress and 
potentially leading to a default on either the senior or junior debt. 
Nonetheless, except in extreme cases66 this sort of refinancing should 
not result in a finding of prejudice to junior lienors. While higher 
monthly payments may impact the mortgagor’s cash flow and 
conceivably make his or her ability to service the junior lien more 
problematic, the transaction clearly also benefits the junior interest. 
For example, assume the borrower’s old loan for $100,000 
carried a 7.5% interest and an original term of 30 years, with 25 years 
remaining at the time of refinancing. Monthly payments on such a 
loan would be $700 per month, and it would have a balance owing 
of $94,510 when refinanced. Assume that the borrower refinances 
that balance with a new loan at 6% interest for 15 years. The new 
monthly payments will be $798, an increase of nearly $100. Despite 
the increased cash flow, because of the lower interest rate and shorter 
amortization on the new senior mortgage, the mortgagor’s total 
interest obligation is reduced and the junior’s position is thus 
strengthened. 
In sum we believe, and the courts generally agree,67 that changes 
in senior loan maturity, at least within a “normal” range of ten to 
thirty years, should be disregarded in examining prejudice to junior 
lienors. “Cash-out” refinancings that involve increases of loan 
balance may be considered prejudicial to juniors, but only if they 
increase the loan-to-value ratio above the 75% or 80% range since 
only above that range do residential mortgage loans exhibit a 
significant risk of default. 
 
 66. By “extreme cases,” we mean situations in which the borrower’s monthly payments 
increase drastically, the term is reduced drastically, or where the borrower would not have been 
able to qualify for the refinancing loan under ordinary payment-to-income ratio requirements. 
See supra note 65. An illustration is provided by Gluskin v. Atlantic Savings & Loan Ass’n, 108 
Cal. Rptr. 318 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973), in which “[t]he principal amount of the loan was reduced 
[from $2.2 million] to $712,530, the interest rate was raised from 6 1/4% to 10%, the 
monthly payments reduced to approximately $5,900 and the maturity of the note shortened 
[from 30 years] to 10 months (with a balloon payment at the end).” Id. at 321. The court 
refused to enforce the change against a subordinating lienholder. Id. at 325. 
 67. As to maturity extensions, see authorities cited supra notes 61–62. We have found 
no case authorities involving a reduction of maturity. 
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C. Refinancing by the Same Lender 
Refinancings by the same lender may use either of two different 
formats. In the first, which is analogous to a refinancing by a new 
lender considered above, the lender cancels the original note and 
releases its mortgage of record. At the same time, the mortgagor 
executes a new note and mortgage and the lender promptly records 
the mortgage. A new lender’s title insurance policy normally will be 
issued and the premium will be paid by the mortgagor. This type of 
refinancing is appropriately termed a “replacement transaction.” 
In the second type of refinancing transaction by the same lender, 
the original note and mortgage are simply modified by a written 
agreement. No new money is advanced by the lender. We describe 
this as a “modification transaction.” The original mortgage is not 
released of record; rather, the modification agreement is promptly 
recorded. An actual modification transaction from a few years ago 
provides an example. The original loan carried a fixed rate for five 
years at 7%. At the end of the five-year period it would convert to a 
variable-rate loan. It was refinanced at the then-current balance 
during its second year at a fixed interest rate of 5.75% for an 
additional five years at which time it would convert to a variable rate. 
The mortgagor paid the mortgagee a fixed fee of several hundred 
dollars and executed a modification agreement which the lender 
recorded. A new lender’s title policy was not required, making it a 
very efficient transaction. 
Our overall concern in same-lender refinancings is the same as in 
new-lender refinancings discussed above: whether title insurance 
protection is needed against the risk that an intervening lien will gain 
priority over the new loan. Let us consider how mortgage law treats 
intervening junior lienors in each of the foregoing situations. The 
replacement transaction is usually not governed by subrogation 
principles.68 This is because “subrogation cannot be involved unless 
the second loan is made by a different lender than the holder of the 
first mortgage; one cannot be subrogated to one’s own previous 
 
 68. There are a few judicial opinions to the contrary, applying subrogation to benefit 
lenders that refinanced their own prior mortgages. See, e.g., Rush v. Alaska Mortgage Group, 
937 P.2d 647 (Alaska 1997); W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Denver v. Ben Gay, Inc., 436 P.2d 
121 (Colo. 1967); Suntrust Bank v. Riverside Nat’l Bank of Fla., 792 So. 2d 1222 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2001). These courts evince confusion as to the proper context for application of 
subrogation. 
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mortgage.”69 Rather, a different body of law, employing principles 
similar to subrogation, is usually applied. Under section 7.3 of the 
Restatement, when 
a senior mortgage is released of record and, as part of the same 
transaction, is replaced with a new mortgage, the latter mortgage 
retains the same priority as its predecessor, except to the extent that 
any change in the terms of the mortgage or the obligation it 
secures is materially prejudicial to the holder of a junior interest in 
the real estate.70 
The test of material prejudice for replacement purposes is the same as 
in the subrogation context. An increase in the principal amount is 
deemed prejudicial, as is an increase in the interest rate if the rate in 
the original mortgage was fixed.71 
The same principles also govern modification transactions. 
According to the Restatement and the substantial case law 
supporting it, “[i]f a senior mortgage or the obligation it secures is 
modified by the parties, the mortgage as modified retains priority as 
against junior interests in the real estate, except to the extent that the 
 
 69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e (1997). 
 70. Id. § 7.3(a). Many of the cases that are the basis for this Section articulate the rule 
slightly differently—they confer priority on the replacement mortgage as against intervening 
lienors unless “paramount equities” are present. This phrase, like “material prejudice,” is 
grounded in the notion of detrimental reliance. Both the Restatement formulation and the 
cases reflect the same normative principle. The Restatement uses the words “material 
prejudice” simply because they are more descriptive than the “paramount equities” language. 
See id. § 7.3 Reporter’s Note to cmt. b; see also Farmers & Merch. Bank v. Riede, 565 So. 2d 
883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Winnetka Bank, 614 N.E.2d 862 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Rebel v. Nat’l City Bank of Evansville, 598 N.E.2d 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1992); Jackson & Scherer, Inc. v. Washburn, 496 P.2d 1358 (Kan. 1972); Guleserian v. 
Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1966); Commerce Sav. Lincoln, Inc. v. Robinson, 331 N.W.2d 
495 (Neb. 1983); Houston Lumber Co. v. Skaggs, 613 P.2d 416 (N.M. 1980); Resolution 
Trust Corp. v. Barnhart, 862 P.2d 1243, 1248 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (“[W]here a senior 
mortgagee discharges its mortgage of record and contemporaneously takes a new mortgage, 
the senior mortgagee’s lien is not subordinated to intervening liens in the absence of (1) 
evidence of an intent to subordinate, or (2) paramount equities in favor of junior lienholders 
that justify subordinating the senior mortgagee’s lien”—the court refers to this as “equitable 
reinstatement.”); Skaneateles Sav. Bank v. Herold, 376 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); 
Hummel v. Hummel, 896 P.2d 1203 (Okla. Civ. App. 1995); Kellogg Bros. Lumber v. 
Mularkey, 252 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. 1934). Contra Hilco, Inc. v. Lenentine, 698 A.2d 1254 
(N.H. 1997) (refusing to recognize the senior’s mortgagee’s priority for its replacement 
mortgage where it had constructive notice of the intervening liens). The Hilco case is similar to 
the rigid view of subrogation reflected in the cases cited supra note 41. 
 71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3(a) cmt. b (1997); 1 NELSON 
& WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 799. 
1NELSON.FIN 9/5/2006 11:48 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
326 
modification is materially prejudicial to the holders of such 
interests.”72 As in the subrogation and replacement mortgage 
contexts, while a decrease in interest rate73 or an extension of the 
maturity of a senior mortgage74 is not deemed prejudicial, increases 
in either interest rate or the principal amount of the obligation will 
result in a pro tanto loss of priority.75 
In one important respect, both replacement and modification 
lenders receive more favorable treatment than their subrogation 
counterparts. As we have seen, many states that have not yet adopted 
the Restatement approach to subrogation demote in priority new 
refinancing lenders who have actual or constructive knowledge of 
 
 72. Id. § 7.3(b); see, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. BVS Dev., Inc., 42 F.3d 1206 (9th 
Cir. 1994); Crutchfield v. Johnson & Latimer, 8 So. 2d 412 (Ala. 1942); Lennar Ne. Partners 
v. Buice, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Eurovest Ltd. v. 13290 Biscayne Island 
Terrace Corp., 559 So. 2d 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 
223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nuernberger, 284 N.W. 266 (Neb. 
1939); Shultis v. Woodstock Land Dev. Ass’n., 594 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); 
Skaneateles Sav. Bank v. Herold, 376 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975). 
 73. See, e.g., Big Land Inv. Corp. v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 657 P.2d 837 
(Alaska 1983) (decrease in interest rate does not prejudice the interests of junior lienors). 
Contra Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank of S.C. v. Smith, 284 S.E.2d 770 (S.C. 1981). 
 74. See In re Fowler, 83 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1987) (reamortization of two senior 
mortgages after an intervening judgment lien did not affect the priority of those mortgages); 
Guleserian v. Fields, 218 N.E.2d 397 (Mass. 1966) (maturity extension of senior mortgage did 
not impair its priority); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); 1 
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 799–800. 
 75. See, e.g., Bank of Searcy v. Kroh, 114 S.W.2d 26 (Ark. 1938); Lennar Ne. Partners, 
57 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 435, 442 (“[W]hen the obligation is increased, by an increase in the 
principal amount or an increase in the interest rate, the junior lienholder’s position is 
worsened. . . . [T]he impairment to [junior’s] security and its rights as a junior lienholder 
caused by the modification can be fully eliminated by denying priority to the modification.”); 
Burney, 63 S.W.3d at 232 (“‘[W]here the modification entails an increase in the senior 
mortgage interest rate or an increase in its principal amount, the junior lienor will gain priority 
over the earlier mortgage to the extent of the modification’” (quoting 1 GRANT S. NELSON & 
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE § 9.4 (3d. ed. 1993))); Fleet Bank v. County of 
Monroe Indus. Dev. Agency, 637 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (“Where, 
however, the actions of the senior lienor prejudice the junior lienors but do not substantially 
impair their security interest or destroy their equity, the senior lienor will be required to 
relinquish to the junior lienors its priority with respect to the modified terms only.”). Where 
the modifications are extreme, the senior mortgage may sometimes completely lose its priority: 
One situation might be where there is a substantial increase in the mortgage interest 
rate and a long term evenly amortized payment schedule is changed to a one year 
balloon mortgage. This sanction may also be called for where the increase in the 
senior mortgage is so substantial that no equity whatsoever remains to secure junior 
liens. 
1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 801–02. 
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intervening interests.76 By way of contrast, in the context of 
replacement mortgages and modification of mortgages, there is no 
similar penalty on the lender for having actual or constructive 
knowledge of intervening liens. Indeed, in this context, the lender’s 
knowledge is irrelevant. This is true under both the Restatement and 
the case law.77 
In sum, case law currently protects refinancing lenders in both 
the replacement and modification contexts against intervening junior 
interests so long as neither the interest rate nor the principal amount 
of the prior loan is increased. The applicable Restatement sections 
are consistent with these cases. As we have already seen, refinancing 
lenders find less protection in subrogation decisions in many 
jurisdictions because the right to subrogation is conditioned upon 
the lender’s absence of knowledge of intervening interests. Under 
the Restatement, however, protection is afforded to the new lender 
irrespective of such knowledge. The Restatement requires only that 
the new lender expected to have the priority of the old mortgage—
and that expectation should be presumed, as the Restatement says,78 
in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent on the part of the new 
lender. 
The Restatement rule is the fairest approach because it rejects 
conferring a windfall on intervenors who, after all, do not acquire 
their liens and other interests with the expectation of being anything 
but subordinate to a senior mortgage. Courts that refuse to follow 
this approach offer no policy reasons for doing so, but only the 
moralistic argument that the refinancing lender should be ashamed 
of itself for not being more careful—an attitude that tacitly assumes 
the refinancing lender must spend (or more realistically, force its 
borrower to spend) the cost of a new title examination. More 
generally, the Restatement approach is friendly to first mortgage 
refinancing, a process that clearly is beneficial to homeowners. 
Consequently, as a normative matter, we strongly urge the adoption 
of the Restatement subrogation rule. It has already gained 
 
 76. See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text. 
 77. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.3 (1997). For the most 
part, the case law simply ignores the notice issue; see cases cited supra notes 70, 72. The one 
exception seems to be Hilco, Inc. v. Lenentine, 698 A.2d 1254 (N.H. 1997). 
 78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. e, illus. 27 (1997). 
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considerable ground, and we believe and hope it is well on its way to 
becoming the predominant rule.79 
IV. HELPING SUBROGATION WORK: 
TWO SIMPLE MORTGAGE CLAUSES 
While the Restatement’s approach to subrogation has enjoyed a 
strong positive judicial reception since its 1997 adoption,80 there are 
two simple mortgage clauses that, if widely adopted in mortgage 
forms, would greatly strengthen subrogation’s effectiveness in the 
context of mortgage refinancings and advance the overall goal of 
avoiding most or all of the expense of a new title examination. The 
first, discussed in Section A below, is a clause expressly stating that 
the mortgagee intends to have the priority of the previous mortgage 
it is paying off, and the second, discussed in Section B below, is a 
“future advance” clause.  
A. Adopting “Conventional” Subrogation 
The first of these clauses stems from the concept of 
“conventional” subrogation. A word of explanation is in order here. 
The concept of subrogation referred to thus far in this Article, and in 
the great majority of judicial decisions, is usually termed “equitable” 
subrogation, and courts often say they will award it only when 
 
 79. One court recently described the traditional notice-based approach to subrogation 
as being “rapidly eroded” in favor of the Restatement approach. Bank of Am. v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, 109 P.3d 863, 868 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). That court quite obviously would have 
preferred to adopt the Restatement rule, but was constrained from doing so by the stare decisis 
effect of the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Kim v. Lee, 31 P.3d 665, modified, 43 
P.3d 1222 (Wash. 2001). 
 80. See Lamb Excavation, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 95 P.3d 542 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2004); E. Sav. Bank v. Pappas, 829 A.2d 953 (D.C. 2003); Wilkins v. Gibson, 38 
S.E. 374 (Ga. 1901); Bank of N.Y. v. Nally, 820 N.E.2d 644 (Ind. 2005); Klotz v. Klotz, 440 
N.W.2d 406 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); E. Boston Sav. Bank v. Ogan, 701 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 
1998); Burney v. McLaughlin, 63 S.W.3d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Providence Inst. for Sav. 
v. Sims, 441 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. 1969); Farm Credit Bank v. Ogden, 886 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. 
App. 1994); Chi. Title Ins. Co. v. Lawrence Invs., Inc., 782 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. App. 1989); see 
also Trus Joist Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 462 A.2d 603 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1983), rev’d sub nom., Trus Joist Corp. v. Treetop Assocs., Inc., 477 A.2d 817 (N.J. 1984). 
Several lower courts have endorsed the Restatement approach, but have refused to apply it 
because they considered themselves bound by earlier state supreme court decisions that were 
less favorable to subrogation. See First Commonwealth Bank v. Heller, 863 A.2d 1153 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2004); Bank of Am. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 109 P.3d 863 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005). 
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equitable considerations require it.81 There is, however, an alternate 
version of subrogation—conventional subrogation—which is said to 
rest on the existence of an agreement to give the refinancing lender 
the priority of the mortgage which it pays. 
If such an agreement existed between the refinancing lender and 
the intervening lienor, no one would doubt its effectiveness; in 
effect, it would constitute a subordination agreement by the 
intervenor, preventing its lien from being promoted in priority when 
the original first mortgage was paid. But the remarkable thing about 
conventional subrogation is that the agreement need not involve the 
intervening lienor in any way, rather, it can simply be an agreement 
between the refinancing lender and the borrower. As the Nebraska 
Court of Appeals recently put it, “[c]onventional subrogation arises 
where one pays the debt of another under an agreement, existing at 
the time of the payment, with either the debtor or the creditor, that 
the person paying shall be subrogated to the liens existing as security 
for the debt.”82 It is extremely doubtful that conventional 
 
 81. See, e.g., Kim, 31 P.3d at 669 (“Subrogation is fundamentally an equitable concept 
designed ‘to impose ultimate responsibility for a wrong or loss on the party who, in equity and 
good conscience, ought to bear it.’” (quoting Mahler v. Szucs, 957 P.2d 632, 640 (Wash. 
1998))). 
 82. Am. Nat’l Bank v. Clark, 660 N.W.2d 530, 535 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003) (citing 
Hoppe v. Phoenix Homes, Inc., 318 N.W.2d 878 (Neb. 1982)) (emphasis added). Cases 
actually applying conventional mortgage subrogation (rather than merely recognizing the 
concept) are fairly sparse. See, e.g., Vogel v. Veneman, 276 F.3d 729, 735 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(“Contractual subrogation arises when ‘a person advances money to take up and extend 
indebtedness secured by a vendor’s lien on land under an agreement that such person shall 
stand in the place of the original holder of the indebtedness.’ . . . A valid deed of trust 
executed by both the borrower and lender establishes contractual subrogation.” (quoting 
Glassock v. Travellers Ins. Co., 113 S.W.2d 1005, 1009 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) (applying 
Texas law))); Wolf v. Spariosu, 706 So. 2d 881 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (applying 
conventional subrogation where the refinancing lender had an express agreement with the 
borrower to take the priority of the mortgages being paid); LaSalle Bank v. First Am. Bank, 
736 N.E.2d 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (applying conventional subrogation primarily on the 
basis of a provision in a construction loan agreement stating that the borrower was obligated to 
provide a title insurance policy insuring that the construction mortgage was a first lien); Med 
Ctr. Bank v. Fleetwood, 854 S.W.2d 278, 283 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993); Rock River Lumber 
Corp. v. Universal Mortgage Corp. of Wis., 262 N.W.2d 114, 118 (Wis. 1978) (applying 
conventional subrogation where the refinancing mortgage stated “the mortgagor hereby 
covenants that the mortgagor is seized of a good title to the real estate in fee simple, free and 
clear of all encumbrances”). Although numerous Louisiana cases apply conventional 
subrogation, they are not considered here because of the unique features of Louisiana property 
law. See also Bankers Trust Co. v. United States, 25 P.3d 877, 882 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) 
(recognizing but rejecting the application of conventional subrogation and commenting, “[w]e 
fail to see how the intention of [the refinancing lender] has anything to do with whether its 
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subrogation is really a matter of enforcing a contract between the 
refinancing lender and the borrower83—indeed, it is hard to see how 
such a contract could possibly affect the intervening creditor’s rights. 
A much more convincing explanation was provided by the Nebraska 
Supreme Court in a conventional subrogation case many years ago: 
It is not enough to entitle to subrogation that, with the proceeds of 
[a new] mortgage, prior mortgages have been discharged. “The 
real question in all such cases is whether the payment made by a 
stranger was a loan to the debtor through a mere desire to aid him, 
or whether it was made with the expectation of being substituted in 
the place of a creditor. If the former is the case, he is not entitled to 
subrogation; if the latter, he is.”84 
When conventional subrogation is viewed in this light, it becomes 
clear that the courts employing conventional subrogation are saying 
precisely what the Restatement says: that subrogation should be 
granted, irrespective of the subrogee’s knowledge of the intervening 
lien when the subrogee “reasonably expected to receive a security 
interest in the real estate with the priority of the mortgage being 
discharged.”85 The agreement is simply evidence that the subrogee 
had that expectation. 
We need to examine the precise nature of the agreement that is 
needed to trigger the doctrine of conventional subrogation. A recent 
Illinois Court of Appeals case, Aames Capital Corp. v. Interstate 
 
lien is a priority lien upon the property”); Wash. Mut. Bank v. Shorebank Corp., 703 N.W.2d 
486 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing conventional subrogation but refusing to apply in the 
absence of any evidence of an agreement giving the refinancing lender priority). 
 83. See 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, at 829 (“Subrogation in the last case is 
sometimes called ‘conventional’ subrogation and is may [sic] be said to arise from contract, an 
agreement between the subrogee and either the debtor or the creditor, although there is 
serious doubt that its real basis is contractual. An agreement between the debtor and the 
person claiming subrogation clearly does not in itself transfer the right of the creditor to such 
person.”). 
 84. Bohn Sash & Door Co. v. Case, 60 N.W. 576, 581 (Neb. 1894) (quoting 
Tradesmen’s Bldg. & C. Ass’n v. Thompson, 32 N.J. Eq. 133 (N.J. Ch. 1880)). A similar 
point was made in Martin v. Hickenlooper, 59 P.2d 1139, 1152 (Utah 1936): “That equity 
applies the doctrine of subrogation in [conventional subrogation] cases, not in exacting a 
performance of the contract, but as a matter of doing justice under the circumstances; the so-
called agreement only being of value showing such a situation where the doctrine should be 
applied in order to do justice and as evidence that the lender was not a volunteer.” See also 
Rock River Lumber, 262 N.W.2d at 117 (“Even where a definite agreement for subrogation is 
shown, therefore, subrogation will be denied where it would lead to an uncontemplated and 
inequitable result.”). 
 85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997). 
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Bank of Oak Forest,86 is instructive. Aames involved a typical 
refinancing: the new lender, Pacific Thrift & Loan Co., employed 
the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform residential mortgage 
form. After the mortgage documents were executed and recorded, 
Pacific assigned them to Aames. The property was subject to a 
recorded judgment lien in favor of Interstate Bank, which Pacific 
apparently failed to discover. The court noted that the case might 
have been decided on the basis of equitable subrogation, but because 
Illinois authority on that doctrine was sparse, it preferred to use 
conventional subrogation instead. 
Since conventional subrogation requires an agreement between 
the borrower and the new lender that the latter will “inherit” the 
priority of the old mortgage, the court was forced to search the 
Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform mortgage to find such an 
agreement. Unfortunately, no such express agreement exists in that 
standardized document. The court was undaunted. It identified two 
provisions that it felt suggested an intention for the refinancing 
mortgagee to keep the priority of the paid-off mortgage. First, the 
form states that the “[b]orrower shall promptly discharge any lien 
which has priority over this Security Instrument.”87 Second, if the 
borrower fails to perform this duty, the form states that the lender 
can take any reasonable action to protect its rights.88 
A fair reading of these provisions suggests that they are, at most, 
a highly ambiguous statement of the refinancing lender’s expectation 
to gain the priority of the mortgage it paid off. The court conceded 
as much, but nevertheless stated: 
[W]e believe that the above-referenced provisions, when read 
together, indicate that the agreement of the parties was that the 
mortgage held by Pacific would be a first priority mortgage, and 
 
 86. 734 N.E.2d 493 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). 
 87. Aames, 734 N.E.2d at 500; Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform 
Single-Family Instrument, Form 3014 (Illinois), January 2001, ¶ 4, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/uniform/doc/3014-IllinoisMortgage.doc. Quotations in the 
text are from the current version of the form, but it evidently does not vary materially from the 
form reviewed by the court in Aames.  
 88. Freddie Mac, supra note 87, ¶ 9 (“Lender’s actions can include, but are not limited 
to: (a) paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority over this Security Instrument . . . . 
Any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of 
Borrower secured by this Security Instrument.”). 
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that any other prior mortgages of record would be paid off by 
Pacific, with the new mortgage securing that debt.89 
The holding in Aames is obviously a result-oriented stretching of 
the mortgage’s language, but we agree with the result. The court’s 
decision would have been easier had the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac 
form—used for a huge majority of U.S. residential mortgages—
contained an express provision like the following: 
This Security Instrument is intended to create a first lien on the 
Property. Borrower and Lender agree that this Security Instrument 
shall have, and Lender intends and expects to have, the priority of 
any other security instrument that has been paid or discharged with 
the proceeds of the Loan secured by this Security Instrument. 
Adding this language would make the application of conventional 
subrogation almost irresistible, while costing nothing.90 Moreover, in 
a jurisdiction following the Restatement approach to equitable 
subrogation it would enormously solidify the conclusion that the 
mortgagor “reasonably expected to receive a security interest in the 
real estate with the priority of the mortgage being discharged.”91 
While we do not consider such language essential to the application 
of equitable subrogation, it seems only common sense to include it. 
Such language provides no absolute guarantee that a court will apply 
subrogation, but it strongly increases the likelihood. 
B. Using the “Open-end” or Future Advances Clause 
A second clause is designed to meet the problem of cash-out 
refinancing, where the balance on the new loan exceeds the amount 
 
 89. Aames, 734 N.E.2d at 500. The court contrasted the refinancing mortgage before it 
with the mortgage in Firstmark Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Superior Bank, 649 N.E.2d 465 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1995). In that case, the refinancing mortgage contained an express statement 
that it was subject to the prior lien over which the mortgagee now sought priority; the court 
refused to grant conventional subrogation. 
 90. We say “almost” because even a definite agreement is no guarantee of subrogation if 
the result would be inequitable. See, for example, Rock River Lumber Corp. v. Universal 
Mortgage Corp. of Wisconsin, 262 N.W.2d 114 (Wis. 1978), which points out that prejudice to 
the intervening lienor might exist if a delay occurred between the recording of the satisfaction 
of the original mortgage and the recording of the refinancing mortgage, and if the intervening 
lienor extended credit during the period of delay in reliance on the apparently clear title of the 
property at that time. Such a delay had occurred in Rock River, but the court found no reliance 
on it by the intervening lienor, and granted conventional subrogation. 
 91. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) (1997). 
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paid to discharge the old loan.92 As we have already noted, there can 
be no serious doubt that the additional sum advanced will prejudice 
junior lienors, making subrogation against them unjust to that 
extent.93 There is, however, a simple way to overcome this objection 
to full subrogation in a cash-out refinancing: the use of a “future 
advance” or “open-end mortgage” clause in the original mortgage. 
From the 1950s through the 1980s, future advance clauses were 
routinely used in residential mortgages.94 Such a clause might read as 
follows: 
Upon request of Borrower, Lender, at Lender’s option prior to 
release of this Security Instrument, may make future advances to 
Borrower. Such future advances, with interest thereon, shall be 
secured by this Security Instrument when evidenced by promissory 
notes stating that said notes are secured hereby. The maximum 
principal amount of such future advances shall not exceed one-half 
of the original amount secured by this Security Instrument.95 
At no time shall the principal amount of the indebtedness secured 
by this Instrument, not including sums advanced in accordance 
herewith to protect the security of this Instrument, exceed the 
 
 92. Roughly half of all recent refinancings have involved this situation. See supra notes 
47–51 and accompanying text. 
 93. See supra text accompanying notes 54–55. It is arguable that small amounts of cash 
disbursed over and above the balance on the old mortgage should be disregarded and 
subrogation ordered. The court did so in Union Planters Bank v. FT Mortgage Cos., 794 
N.E.2d 360 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003), stating that $4,000 of additional cash did not prevent 
application of conventional subrogation. 
 94. Such clauses were included in standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac mortgage forms 
when they were developed in the 1970s. See, e.g., D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., Nonuniform 
Covenant 20 of the District of Columbia FNMA/FHLMC Single Family Deed of Trust Form, 
LAW OF FED. MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS app. a (1989). Use of future advance clauses was 
apparently discontinued in those forms in the early 1990s. This was confirmed by a 
conversation of one of the coauthors with John Mansfield, Vice President and Deputy General 
Counsel, Federal National Mortgage Association, September 9, 1994.  
 95. The language is derived from the clause quoted in In re Hawkins, 156 B.R. 745 
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1993). We have modified it to be consistent with the terminology of the 
current Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac uniform one-to-four-family mortgage instrument. For 
similar illustrations, see Hill v. Delta Loan & Finance Co., 277 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Ark. 1955); 
Downing v. First National Bank, 81 So. 2d 486, 488 (Fla. 1955). Note that this clause 
contemplates that the additional advance will refer specifically to the original mortgage and, 
therefore, differs from a “dragnet” clause, which typically provides that the mortgage will 
secure “any other indebtedness that may be owed to lender by borrower.” See 1 NELSON & 
WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 12.7, for an extended discussion of dragnet clauses. 
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original amount of the Note (US$___________) plus the additional 
sum of US$____________.96 
The priority of advances under this sort of clause has traditionally 
depended on whether the advances were optional or obligatory. The 
traditional rule held that unless the lender had a contractual duty to 
make the future advance, it would lose priority to any intervening 
liens that the lender had notice of when the advance was made.97 
This rule would render the future advance clause useless in 
preserving the priority of the full mortgage balance in a cash-out 
refinancing, which by its nature involves the making of an optional 
and discretionary advance. 
However, the advent of statutory changes in a large number of 
jurisdictions and the teaching of the Restatement on this issue have 
caused a major change in the legal attitude toward the priority of 
future advances. The Restatement takes the view that all future 
advances should be granted the priority of the original mortgage but 
permits the borrower to issue a “cut-off notice” to the lender, 
terminating the borrower’s right to any additional advances.98 Under 
the Restatement, so long as the lender has not received a cut-off 
notice, it can be confident that all of the advances it makes will carry 
the original mortgage’s priority. 
Changes in the law along similar lines have become quite 
pervasive, mainly because of statutory changes during the past 
twenty-five years. The Restatement contains a statutory table 
 
 96. The final sentence appeared in the “nonuniform covenants” of the Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac form in a number of jurisdictions; it was inserted to comply with individual 
state statutes requiring a statement in the mortgage of the maximum amount of principal to be 
secured. An illustrative clause appeared as Nonuniform Covenant 33 of the Texas 
FNMA/FHLMC Multifamily Deed of Trust form, reprinted in GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. 
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 14.16, cl. 33 (3d ed. 1993). 
 97. See, e.g., Model Home Bldg., Inc. v. Turnquist, 102 N.W.2d 717 (Minn. 1960) 
(refusing to accord priority to the advances because they were optional, without reference to 
senior lender’s notice of junior liens); S. Trust Mortgage Co. v. K & B Door Co., 763 P.2d 
353 (Nev. 1988) (granting obligatory advances priority over intervening mechanic’s liens); 
Colonial Bank v. Marine Bank, 448 N.W.2d 659 (Wis. 1989) (refusing to recognize priority of 
optional advances made at a time when senior lender had actual knowledge of junior liens). On 
the complex question of whether, and what sort of, notice of junior liens to the senior lender 
will cause the senior lender to lose priority, see Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, 
Rethinking Future Advance Mortgages: A Brief for the Restatement Approach, 44 DUKE L.J. 
657, 680–82 (1995). 
 98. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 2.3 (1997). 
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summarizing the priority of future advances in all fifty states.99 In 
thirty-five states, even an optional future advance will ordinarily 
retain priority. In sixteen of these states, the borrower is empowered 
to send a cut-off notice terminating further advances, and any 
advances made thereafter will lose priority. In another eleven states, 
the lender will lose priority for advances made after the lender 
receives written notice of the presence of any intervening lien.100 
These notice procedures should cause no risk to lenders; in the 
relatively rare case in which a senior lender receives a cut-off notice 
or notice of the existence of a junior lien, the senior lender would 
simply place the notice in the loan file to warn that the senior lender 
could not safely make any additional advances. Since the original 
mortgage’s priority continues to govern under these statutes, no title 
examination or new title insurance would be necessary. 
Of the thirty-five states listed in the Restatement as protecting 
the priority of future advances, twenty-eight also require a statement 
of maximum principal amount, either to ensure the priority of the 
advance or to establish its validity as a secured claim.101 For this 
reason, a provision like the second sentence of the clause in the 
indented quotation above is essential in those states. Once again, this 
is not a burdensome requirement. The lender might, for example, set 
the maximum total amount at roughly fifty percent above the 
amount of the original loan. This would be more than sufficient for 
the vast majority of refinancings.102 
On its face the future advances clause enables the borrower to 
refinance, without the expense of a title examination and title 
insurance, with the same lender that made the original mortgage 
loan. However, for a variety of reasons, the borrower may wish to 
 
 99. Id. § 2.1 statutory note.  
 100. Id. Some of the statutes listed also require recording of the notice. Those requiring 
recording also require direct notice to the senior mortgagee, thus eliminating any concern that 
a title examination by the mortgagee would be necessary prior to the making of the additional 
advance. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-2 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 697.04(1)(b) (2005); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-B, § 436(1)(A), (2) (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-238.01(1) (2005); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-72(a) (2005) (document to be recorded must be requested from 
mortgagee); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 5301.232(C) (West 2005). 
 101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 2.1 statutory note. 
 102. Based on the data collected by the Federal Reserve Board on cash-out refinancings 
in 2001–2002, the average additional amount of cash taken was only about twenty-one 
percent of the current loan balance (and hence, an even smaller percentage of the original loan 
balance, which would have been paid down somewhat by monthly amortization payments). See 
supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
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obtain the refinancing from a different lender—one who is offering 
more attractive loan terms, for example. The subrogation doctrine 
that we advance allows the refinancing lender to take advantage of a 
future advance clause in the original mortgage. Subrogation, after all, 
is nothing more than an assignment of the original mortgage to the 
refinancing lender by operation of law.103 Hence, the refinancing 
lender’s rights should not be materially different than if it had 
acquired the original mortgage by a literal, written assignment.104 
While we have found no case directly raising this issue, courts in 
other contexts have readily permitted mortgage assignees to benefit 
from clauses in the original mortgages.105 Ordinarily, of course, 
subrogation is applicable only to the extent that the proceeds of the 
refinance loan are applied to pay the original loan.106 But if the 
benefit of the future advance clause is available to the new lender, 
the limitations of the subrogation theory for cash-out refinancing 
simply disappear in all cases in which the original mortgage contains 
an appropriate future advance clause. Any intervening lienors can 
hardly complain since they knew of the risk of being subjected to a 
larger prior lien by the recorded future advance clause.107 That risk is 
 
 103. See G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 657 A.2d 1170, 1179 (Md. 
1995); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. a. 
 104. It seems obvious that a mortgage investor taking an assignment of a note and 
mortgage containing a future advance clause would be permitted to make advances under the 
clause and have the benefit of the priority that would have been available to the original 
mortgagee. See Texas Bank of Beaumont v. Bozorg, 457 So. 2d 667 (La. 1984), in which a 
bank taking an assignment of a mortgage and subsequently making additional advances made 
this argument. The court rejected the argument on the ground that the original loan 
agreement did not sufficiently reflect an intention that future advances would be covered by 
the mortgage, but appeared to agree that if the agreement had been sufficient, the advances by 
the assignee would have been entitled to priority under Louisiana law. Id. at 672–73. 
 105. See Ala.-Fla. Co. v. Mays, 149 So. 61, 64 (Fla. 1933) (“The general rule is that the 
assignee of a mortgage is invested with the powers and interests of the mortgagee as fully as if 
he had been named such in the mortgage.”); Money Store Inv. Corp. v. Summers, 822 
N.E.2d 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (Transfer Granted, Opinion Vacated, IN RAP 58(A)) 
(permitting assignee of mortgage to exercise rights under mortgage’s dragnet clause); In re 
McCurdy’s Estate, 154 A. 707 (Pa. 1931) (same). 
 106. See, e.g., Union Planters Bank v. FT Mortgage Cos., 794 N.E.2d 360, 365 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2003) (permitting a subrogated refinancing lender to gain priority despite a small increase 
in the loan balance). 
 107. See Bank of Barron v. Gieseke, 485 N.W.2d 426, 436 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) 
(“[B]ecause the [intervening lienors] were aware of the future advance clause, they had notice 
that their claims would be subordinate to any liens falling within the purview of the [senior 
mortgage].”). 
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not materially different if the additional advance is made by a 
different lender rather than by the original lender. 
In sum, the two clauses discussed above have the potential to 
eliminate virtually all of the problematic aspects of equitable 
subrogation as applied to mortgage refinancings. The clause 
expressing the refinancing lender’s intent to acquire the priority of 
the mortgage being paid off will, under the conventional 
subrogation concept, ensure that the courts are not burdened by 
debates about the refinancing lender’s notice or knowledge of 
intervening liens. The clause providing for future advances will give 
the refinancing lender the ability to provide cash out without worry 
about loss of priority for the additional cash. Both clauses are 
essentially free; they involve no cost beyond a slight rewording of 
existing mortgage forms. 
C. Expanding Subrogation to New Debtors 
Once the notion is accepted, as outlined above, that a mortgage 
lien may extend through more than one financing of a given debtor’s 
property, the question arises whether it may extend to more than 
one debtor. Consider a case in which an original mortgage, 
containing a future advance clause and appropriate “conventional” 
subrogation language (if necessary to actuate subrogation under 
applicable state law), is assumed by a new owner of the real estate. It 
would be highly desirable if the mortgage lien—enlarged as necessary 
to meet the financial needs of the new owner of the property but 
only within the limitations imposed by the future advance clause—
could continue to secure the new owner’s purchase-money debt. 
However, it is standard doctrine that subrogation is assumed to 
apply only to debts incurred by the original debtor. 
 
The necessity for such a “warning” may be somewhat overblown in any event. In the 
analogous situation involving personal property security under article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, subordinate lienors lose priority to future advances made under an 
appropriate clause in the senior security agreement, even though the security agreement itself is 
not a matter of public record (since only a financing statement, and not the entire security 
agreement, need be filed). In effect, all subordinate lienors of personal property security must 
accept the risk that a future advance clause in the senior security agreement will impair their 
position. See U.C.C. § 9-310 (2000) (generally requiring filing for perfection of a security 
interest); id. § 9-323 (generally giving all future advances the priority of the original security 
agreement); id. § 9-323 cmt. 3 (stating that if a financing statement has been filed, “it is 
abundantly clear that the time when an advance is made plays no role in determining priorities 
among conflicting security interests”). 
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This assumption is well illustrated by the Alabama Court of Civil 
Appeals’ opinion in Collateral Investment Co. v. Pilgrim.108 A 
developer, Cameron, built a townhouse project with funds lent by 
Central Bank on the security of a construction mortgage.109 
Cameron failed to pay Pilgrim, a supplier of electrical equipment, for 
the project, giving Pilgrim the right to file a materialman’s lien.110 
However, before the lien was filed, Cameron sold two of the houses 
to Burleson and Hatfield, who borrowed mortgage funds from 
Collateral to finance their purchases.111 Pilgrim filed its lien after 
these sales were consummated.112 Collateral attempted to gain 
priority over the lien by asserting a right of subrogation to the 
construction loan, which clearly would have had priority over the 
lien and which had been paid off pro-rata with the funds lent by 
Collateral.113 However, the court rejected Collateral’s assertions:114 
We cannot find in the present case that the money was advanced at 
the instance of the debtor to satisfy the prior incumbrance [sic]. 
The debtor to Central was Cameron. Collateral’s debtors were 
Burleson and Hatfield. Burleson and Hatfield were not debtors of 
Central. Therefore Burleson and Hatfield had no obligation to 
Central. Although it is clear that Collateral paid this debt to 
Central in order to satisfy the encumbrance, this was not done at 
the instance of Cameron. . . . Collateral argues that it advanced 
money for the express purpose of satisfying this prior encumbrance. 
However, we cannot agree. Collateral loaned this money to the 
individuals based on these individuals’ credit. The money was not 
loaned for the express purpose of satisfying this prior 
encumbrance.115 
Clearly, the Alabama court’s assumption was that only a request 
by the original debtor for a payment of the debt will result in 
subrogation. Yet there seems to be no particular reason to make this 
assumption, and the statements of the subrogation principle made by 
 
 108. 421 So. 2d 1274 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1274–75. 
 112. Id. at 1275. 
 113. Id. at 1275–76. 
 114. Id. at 1276. 
 115. Id. 
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most courts do not intrinsically embody it.116 We must concede that 
cases in which subrogation has actually been applied after a transfer 
of the property or a substitution of debtors are rare indeed. We are 
aware of only one in which the issue was seriously considered: East 
Boston Savings Bank v. Ogan.117 There, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court adopted the broad, “no-fault” Restatement view of 
subrogation. The decision clearly reflects the court’s understanding 
that it was doing something a bit unusual118 in applying subrogation 
to a case in which the property had been sold at the time of the new 
financing: 
Because we find that the equities are substantially similar in 
refinancing and sales transactions, and that application of equitable 
subrogation to a sale is consistent with our precedent, we hold that 
equitable subrogation applies in this case. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [T]he distinction between a sale and a refinancing exists, but 
subrogation arising out of either context yields the same result.119 
The Massachusetts court’s understanding is correct. Moreover, if 
widely applied, and if used with mortgage documents containing 
appropriate future advance clauses, that understanding would have 
the potential to eliminate the need for lenders’ title insurance 
coverage in a vast additional class of cases involving new purchase-
money financing of real estate sales. At the same time, adoption of 
the principle would earn the undying enmity of the title insurance 
industry, depriving it of a major source of its revenue. Of course, the 
need for title insurance would not be wholly eliminated in sale 
transactions since the purchaser of the property (who, not being a 
lender, would be ineligible for subrogation) would still need 
assurance that she or he is obtaining title of an acceptable quality. 
 
 116. Perhaps presciently, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6(b)(4) 
(1997) does not make this assumption. It makes subrogation appropriate if the refinancing 
lender pays the original mortgage debt “upon a request from the obligor or the obligor’s 
successor to do so.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 117. 701 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1998). The court applied subrogation to benefit a lender 
making a loan to the purchasers of the property in National City Mortgage Co. v. Ross, 117 
P.3d 880 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005). However, there is no indication in the opinion that the court 
realized it was doing anything novel. 
 118. The court cited no authority outside of Massachusetts for its action. Id. 
 119. Id. at 334–36. 
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We do not advocate here the application of subrogation to 
mortgages on properties that have been sold to new owners. Case 
authority supporting it is extremely limited, and it lies outside the 
ordinary scope of the subrogation doctrine. Perhaps the notion is 
too radical, portending too great a change in established, 
conventional practices in real estate sales. Or perhaps its time is 
simply yet to come. We present it merely to illustrate the potential 
power of the subrogation doctrine, and to suggest that a modest 
amount of creative thinking about the priority of mortgages might 
result in the saving of a great deal of money. Even without applying 
subrogation to properties whose title is being transferred, the two 
clauses described in this section—the clause expressing the lender’s 
intent to have the prior mortgage’s priority120 and the clause 
providing for future advances121—can enormously solidify the legal 
foundation for the subrogation concept, and hence can vastly reduce 
the need for new title protection when refinancings occur. 
V. IS THERE A REMAINING ROLE FOR TITLE 
INSURANCE IN REFINANCING? 
It is clear that at present, the primary role of title examination 
and title insurance in the context of a mortgage refinancing is to 
ensure that there are no intervening liens or other interests in the 
property that might gain priority over the new mortgage. As the 
courts adopt the concept of subrogation we advocate, this function 
will become unnecessary. Hence, we consider here whether title 
insurance provides any other “value added” to refinancing lenders 
sufficient to justify their continued insistence that borrowers 
purchase it. 
A. Protective Functions of Title Insurance 
In addition to insuring against intervening liens, title insurance 
provides certain other protections to a refinancing mortgage lender. 
One clear advantage of title insurance is that it, in effect, guarantees 
the authenticity of the borrowers’ signatures on the refinancing 
documents—the promissory note and the mortgage or other security 
 
 120. See supra notes 81–91 and accompanying text. 
 121. See supra notes 92–107 and accompanying text. 
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instrument.122 This is insurance against forgery, and forgery is hardly 
unknown among mortgage borrowers.123 Various forms of incapacity 
of the borrowers—infancy, insanity, duress, and the like—are also 
insured against.124 However, if the doctrine of subrogation is 
otherwise available, it will almost certainly solve these problems as 
well as the problem of the intervening lien. Subrogation, after all, 
does not require that the refinancing lender in fact have a valid 
mortgage, but only that the refinancing lender have paid off the old 
loan with the expectation of having a valid (and prior) mortgage. 
Hence, if the new mortgage is a forgery, is granted without capacity, 
or its execution is defective in some other way, the refinancing lender 
is still entitled to the validity (and priority) of the old mortgage.125 
The new lender may still be at risk with respect to any “cash out” 
unless the old mortgage contains a future advances clause,126 but its 
concern about mortgage defects is obviously greatly mitigated by 
subrogation. Hence, the absence of title insurance would be far less 
significant than it might first appear. 
A similar issue arises if a mortgage is given by a person currently 
in bankruptcy. Because the bankrupt debtor’s estate is entirely under 
the control of the trustee in bankruptcy or debtor in possession, any 
transfer is subject to approval by the bankruptcy court, and a 
mortgage given without court approval is voidable.127 Once again, 
 
 122. See American Land Title Ass’n, Questions About Title Insurance, 
http://www.alta.org/consumer/questions.cfm (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
 123. See id.; see also Brant v. Hargrove, 632 P.2d 978 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (wife’s 
signature forged on mortgage given by husband); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Hardisty, 646 
N.E.2d 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (husband’s signature on mortgage given by wife); Bank One 
v. Koch, 649 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (signature on mortgage of one tenant in 
common forged by the other tenant in common). 
 124. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Inter-County Title Guar. & Mortgage Co., 213 So. 2d 518 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (mortgage from corporation improperly executed by officers in their 
personal capacities); Narbeth Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Bryn Mawr Trust Co., 190 A. 149 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1937) (individual spouse alone lacked authority to transfer any interest in property 
held in tenancy by the entirety). 
 125. See Union-Davenport Trust & Sav. Bank v. Lyons, 212 N.W. 380 (Iowa 1927) 
(holding that even if mortgage signatures were forged, refinancing lender obtained a valid lien 
by subrogation); see also Kuske v. Staley, 28 P.2d 728 (Kan. 1934); Fed. Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n 
v. Woodbury, 679 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y v. 
McFadden, 72 P.2d 795 (Okla. 1937). 
 126. See supra text accompanying notes 92–107.  
 127. 11 U.S.C. § 549 (2000). If the bankruptcy petition was filed involuntarily, the 
transfer is not voidable unless made after an order of relief is entered. Id. § 549(b). Interests in 
property transferred to bona fide purchasers are not voidable. Id. § 549(c). However, to 
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however, subrogation would almost certainly give the refinancing 
lender great, if not total, protection if the original mortgage had 
been recorded prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition.128 
Even if subrogation did not insulate refinancing lenders against 
the risks described above, those risks are rarely significant, and 
lenders might well decide simply to absorb them rather than impose 
the costs of new title insurance policies on their customers. After all, 
banks and other institutional lenders accept many other sorts of loan 
documents from borrowers without any insurance of their validity. 
Examples include unsecured promissory notes, security agreements 
based on personal property collateral, and modifications of existing 
mortgage loan agreements. Lenders typically do nothing to 
corroborate the authenticity of these documents or the signatures on 
them beyond asking to see a government-issued photo identification 
and, perhaps, including a statement in the loan application that the 
borrower has not filed and will not file bankruptcy. These risks are 
not covered by title insurance,129 but they are simply not thought 
great enough to warrant particular concern. 
A second advantage of title insurance is its coverage of what 
might be called the “delayed recording gap.” The issue arises 
because the old lender in a refinancing transaction is rarely willing to 
provide a recordable discharge of its mortgage until after (sometimes 
several weeks or months after) it receives its payoff. During this 
“gap” period there is, at least conceptually, some risk that the old 
lender will refuse or fail to provide a discharge, perhaps taking the 
position that the payoff amount is inadequate (despite the fact that it 
is invariably based on a written payoff statement supplied by the old 
lender). A number of statutes, including the newly promulgated 
Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act, attempt to mitigate 
this risk by use of a variety of measures, including: obligating paid-
 
qualify as a bona fide purchaser, the refinancing lender would need to perform a title 
examination, thus defeating the objective we seek here. See In re McConville, 110 F.3d 47 
(9th Cir. 1997) (The parties stipulated that the lender was a bona fide purchaser, but the court 
seemed unconvinced; it recognized the lender as having a lien to recover the principal amount 
of its loan, but no more.). 
 128. See In re Halabi, 184 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (original mortgage was recorded 
prior to filing of bankruptcy; secondary market investor who took assignment of mortgage 
after bankruptcy filing was protected by original mortgage priority as against bankruptcy’s 
trustee’s “strong-arm” powers). 
 129. See, e.g., Bank of Miami Beach v. Lawyers Title Guar. Fund, 214 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (title insurance does not protect lender from forgery of promissory note). 
1NELSON.FIN 9/5/2006 11:48 AM 
305] Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation Principles 
 343 
off lenders to issue discharges;130 imposing damages liability and 
penalties on lenders who fail to do so;131 making payoff statements 
binding on those who reasonably and detrimentally rely on them;132 
and as a last resort, permitting title insurance companies or other 
settlement agents to record a discharge if the lender has failed to do 
so despite ample notice.133 But these measures are not perfect and 
disputes still arise between old and new lenders as to whether the 
payoff amount was proper. Fortunately, the amount disputed is 
typically small134 and, in the vast majority of cases, is probably 
resolved without a claim on the title insurance carrier, much less any 
litigation. Hence, the absence of the theoretical protection of title 
insurance is unlikely to be thought significant by refinancing lenders. 
A third value of title insurance is the insurance underwriter’s 
obligation to pay the expense of litigation involving the refinancing 
lender’s title to the mortgaged property. This is a widely touted 
 
 130. Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act § 201 (2004). For a brief 
description of the state statutes, see 1 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 6.6 nn.31–36 
and accompanying text. The duty to provide a discharge exists as a matter of common law as 
well. See id. § 6.6 n.28; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 6.4(b) (1997).  
 131. Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act § 203. 
 132. Id. § 202. Under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 1.6(c) a lender 
issuing a payoff statement “may be estopped to deny its accuracy as against one who has 
reasonably and detrimentally relied on” it. However, lenders often litter their payoff statements 
with disclaimers (e.g., “this statement is subject to final reconciliation by the issuer”), the effect 
of which is uncertain. See Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act § 201 cmt. 7. 
 133. Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act §§ 301–306. 
 134. Based on discussions held during the drafting of the Uniform Residential Mortgage 
Satisfaction Act, two types of disputes commonly arise. In one situation, the borrower has paid, 
and the lender has credited to the borrower’s account, a regular monthly payment received by 
check shortly before the payoff statement is issued. A few days later, the check is dishonored by 
the drawee bank and the lender adds its amount to the original payoff figure. However, the 
refinance closing may already have occurred by this time, based on the original figure. 
The second situation involves expenditures made by, or on behalf of, the original lender 
shortly before the issuance of the payoff statement is issued for such items as inspections to the 
property, payment of expenses to preserve the property, attorneys’ fees involved in attempting 
to collect a delinquency, or the like. If the lender does not receive a bill for such services until 
after the payoff statement is issued, it will want to add their amounts to the original payoff 
figure. Again, the refinance closing may already have occurred by this time. 
The amounts involved in these disputes are likely to be relatively small: a few hundred, 
or at most, a few thousand dollars. Moreover, the original lender can ordinarily prove 
convincingly that the additional money is owed. Interview with Professor R. Wilson 
Freyermuth, Reporter, Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act, in Columbia, Mo. (July 
7, 2005). Hence, there is little point in attempting to shift this sort of loss to a title insurer. 
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benefit of all title insurance,135 although perhaps it amounts to a bit 
less than it appears since it is not uncommon for a title insurer to 
refuse to defend the insured’s title, leading to litigation between the 
insured and the insurer.136 Nonetheless, the value of the insurer’s 
obligation to defend the title cannot be discounted. At least in 
jurisdictions in which the reach of the subrogation doctrine is 
uncertain or is readily contested, there is clear value to lenders in 
having someone else pay the costs of the contest. 
However, if we are correct that a new and broader concept of 
subrogation is gaining ground, the need for litigation will surely 
diminish as that process proceeds. Obviously, litigation can arise in 
any dispute, but lenders do not think it essential to be insured for 
litigation costs in the general run of consumer or commercial loan 
transactions in which they engage. Once the lender’s risk of loss of 
lien priority is eliminated by the application of a more modern 
concept of subrogation, it is unlikely that the remaining risks of 
litigation will be considered worth insuring against. 
Title insurance agents often perform one additional service in 
mortgage refinancing that is not intrinsically related to the insuring 
function: they handle the settlement or closing. This involves 
obtaining a payoff figure from the existing mortgagee, preparing or 
procuring preparation of the necessary documents, obtaining the 
parties’ signatures, recording the new mortgage and the satisfaction 
of the old mortgage, and disbursing the funds from the new loan to 
those entitled to receive them. Whether it makes sense for a lender 
to “farm out” these functions is highly debatable in cases in which 
the settlement agent is not also performing a title examination and 
 
 135. “The Loan Policy guarantees the lender a valid and enforceable lien, and assures that 
no claimant other than those noted in the policy has a prior claim against the real estate. The 
policy assures that the purchaser-borrower has title to the property being pledged as security 
for the loan. And, the policy obligates the title insurer to pay for defending against any claim 
filed against the title that might supersede the lender’s lien. If unsuccessful, it must also satisfy 
that claim should it be upheld in court.” American Land Title Ass’n, Title Insurance: A 
Comprehensive Overview 6, available at http://www.alta.org/press/ 
TitleInsuranceOverview.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). 
 136. See JOYCE D. PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE § 11:3 (Release 3, August 2005). If the 
insured prevails in such a suit, the insurer will usually be liable for the attorneys’ fees and 
litigation expenses incurred by the insured in defending its own title. Id. § 10.4(5) nn.15–21. 
However, that can be a long road, surely not one likely to be taken unless the amount involved 
is very substantial. 
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issuing title insurance.137 For small, low-volume lenders, the 
delegation of these duties to a separate settlement agent may well be 
efficient, avoiding the necessity of training and paying in-house 
personnel whose time would be divided between these and other 
functions. For larger lenders, whose volume is sufficient to keep in-
house staff busy, it is likely that when title insurance is no longer 
necessary, the settlement function will be brought back into the 
lender’s organization.138 Whether to continue to outsource 
settlement services—to title insurance agents, to independent escrow 
 
 137. Outsourcing the settlement function has the advantage of placing it in the hands of 
personnel who are presumably well trained and skilled in the process, but it has the 
disadvantage of requiring the movement of large volumes of paper between the lender and the 
settlement provider, with the attendant risks of miscommunication and lost documents. 
 138. Both of the present authors well recall their early days of law practice in the 1960s in 
Minneapolis and Los Angeles, when it was commonplace for lenders to handle their own 
closings. 
In 2002, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued a proposed 
regulation that would have amended HUD’s interpretation of the Federal Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2604 (2000). See 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134 (July 29, 
2002). The proposal (which was never made final) would have introduced the concept of the 
Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement (GMPA), under which mortgage lenders would 
have been permitted to provide a wide variety of settlement services, include the lender’s title 
insurance costs, into a single fee to be charged to the borrower. Such a fee would have been 
readily comparable among lenders, unlike the plethora of fees and charges often imposed at 
present. This would, HUD believed, have led to greater price competition and ultimately to 
the driving down of settlement costs for consumers. The proposal was greeted warmly by 
larger lenders, but met with squeals of pain from the title insurance industry and a variety of 
other providers of settlement services. Consumer groups generally welcomed it, although they 
complained that it did nothing to resolve the problems of predatory lending. See Sheldon E. 
Hochberg, HUD’s RESPA Regulations: The Proposals, the Comments, the Future, TITLE NEWS, 
Jan.–Feb. 2003, available at http://www.alta.org/publications/titlenews/03/01_01.cfm. 
The proposal was similar to one made by one of the present authors eighteen years earlier. See 
Dale A. Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 62 GEO. L.J. 1311, 
1346–60 (1974). 
HUD predicted that lenders who offered GMPAs would have an incentive to bargain 
down their costs of loan origination, either by negotiating more favorable contracts with 
existing suppliers of settlement services or by bringing the services in-house. See HUD, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ANALYSIS FOR RESPA 
PROPOSED RULE TO SIMPLIFY AND IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING MORTGAGES TO 
REDUCE SETTLEMENT COSTS TO CONSUMERS (July 2002), available at 
http://www.compliancetimes.org/pdfs/ea-chapters.pdf. Since title examination is the element 
of settlement services requiring the greatest technical expertise, if that function were no longer 
necessary it is even more likely that larger lenders would internalize the remaining functions. 
The HUD GMPA concept is not dead but is certainly severely wounded at this writing, 
two years after it was proposed. See 70 Fed. Reg. 37,646 (June 29, 2005) (HUD 
announcement of a series of roundtable discussions to consider how its RESPA reform 
proposals might be recast). 
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companies, or to other types of entities—is a matter of business 
judgment that each lender will need to answer.139 But as the 
subrogation doctrine evolves and title insurance becomes 
increasingly unnecessary, it is clear that the net cost of the 
refinancing transaction will be decreased, regardless of who handles 
the settlement. 
B. Informational Functions of Title Insurance 
One function currently served by title insurers in mortgage 
refinancing will remain essential even if a broad view of subrogation 
is widely adopted. The refinancing lender or its settlement agent 
must have some mechanism for determining what lender holds the 
existing first mortgage simply because it is necessary to (1) obtain a 
payoff statement from that lender, (2) transmit the payoff funds to it, 
and (3) obtain from it a recordable discharge of the old mortgage.140 
None of these acts can occur until the holder of the original 
mortgage is identified. Presently, title insurance companies or agents 
ordinarily perform this service and provide the information to the 
lender or its settlement agent in a title insurance binder, preliminary 
title report, or other similar document. 
Fortunately, title insurance is not the only way for refinancing 
lenders to gain the needed information. One alternative for the 
refinancing lender is to ask the mortgagor to present the existing 
title insurance policy that was issued when the property was acquired 
or previously refinanced. Mortgagors might be asked to provide, 
along with the title policy, a brief affidavit that states that the policy 
presented accurately represents the current holder of the first 
mortgage and perhaps a photocopy of their payment book, billing 
statement, or other recent correspondence from the current 
mortgage servicer.141 The refinancing lender would then verify the 
information by requesting a payoff statement from the servicer.142 
 
 139. This discretion is fettered in some jurisdictions by rules governing the unauthorized 
practices of law. See, e.g., Bishop v. Jefferson Title Co., 28 P.3d 802 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) 
(employee of escrow company engaged in unauthorized practice of law). 
 140. This process is aptly described in Uniform Residential Mortgage Satisfaction Act, 
Prefatory Note (2004). 
 141. These items would alert the refinancing lender to any change in servicing that might 
have occurred after recordation of the existing mortgage. “Servicing” refers to the processes of 
collecting loan payments, maintaining any escrow accounts for taxes and insurance, paying 
those items out of the relevant escrow accounts, making collection efforts if a payment default 
occurs, and, if necessary, foreclosing the mortgage. In modern mortgage practice, servicing is 
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A second alternative method for the refinancing lender to learn 
the identity of the existing mortgagee is the use of one of several 
Internet-based services providing basic title information. Some of 
these services are operated by title insurers143 and others by 
independent businesses.144 Their cost is extremely modest in 
comparison with conventional title insurance policies.145 
Yet a third alternative for the refinancing lender that is rapidly 
becoming more readily available is to check the public records 
directly on the Internet.146 An increasing number of public recorders’ 
offices have made their records directly searchable online, and many 
more are certain to do so in the near future.147 The recent adoption 
of the Uniform Real Property Electronic Recording Act148 by the 
 
often divorced from the holding of the loan and is carried out by a different entity than the 
holder. The servicer is an agent of the mortgage holder for purposes of carrying out the 
functions indicated above. See generally Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market—
A Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991 (1986) (discussing the 
development of the modern secondary mortgage market). 
 142. In theory, if a payoff were erroneously made to the original mortgagee after the 
mortgage had been assigned on the secondary market (with a corresponding change of 
servicing), the refinancing lender making the payoff could be liable to pay a second time. See 
Dale A. Whitman, Reforming the Law: The Payment Rule as a Paradigm, 1998 BYU L. REV. 
1169, 1171. This risk is eliminated for non-negotiable promissory notes by RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.5 (1997). In all events, it arises mainly with individual 
lenders, and is a risk of minuscule proportions when institutional first mortgage lenders are 
involved. Whitman, supra, at 1197. 
 143. See, e.g., RealQuest, operated by First American Real Estate Solutions, 
http://firstamres.com/products/realquest.jsp?CMP=KNC-GOOG (last visited Jan. 30, 
2006); Land Records, operated by Fidelity National Title Ins. Co., 
https://www.fntic.com/services/l_records.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
 144. See, e.g., HomeInfoMax, 
http://www.homeinfomax.com/Real_Property_Records.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
 145. For example, “Title and Vesting” reports from RealQuest, supra note 143, are $20 
each with a $300 monthly purchase commitment by the subscriber, or $25 each with no 
commitment. Detailed reports from HomeInfoMax, supra note 144, are about the same price. 
 146. See Dale A. Whitman, Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic 
Recording Act, 24 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 245 (2002); Dale A. Whitman, Digital Recording of 
Real Estate Documents, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 227 (1999). 
 147. See PROPERTY RECORDS INDUSTRY ASS’N, URPERA ENACTMENT AND 
ERECORDING STANDARDS IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE (Draft 1.3, 2005) (on file with author) 
(indicating that forty-eight counties or other local jurisdictions had adopted electronic 
recording procedures by 2004). Nearly all of these counties’ procedures provide for online 
viewing of recorded documents, as do many other recorders that are not yet accepting 
electronic recording. 
 148. The Act was approved by the Conference in August 2004. The NCCUSL website 
indicates that at the time of this writing it has been introduced in seven jurisdictions and 
enacted in five: Arizona, Delaware, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, and Texas. See 
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National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws will 
facilitate this movement’s growth. Determining the identity of the 
lender holding the existing first mortgage on a residential property is 
a simple task under most of these online records systems. 
In sum, the advantages of title insurance to refinancing lenders—
apart from assurance against loss of lien priority—are marginal at 
best. If the Restatement’s approach to mortgage refinancing is 
widely adopted, title insurance may or may not continue to be used 
by refinancing lenders. If it continues to play a role, its benefits will 
be far less significant than in the past, and its cost should be reduced 
commensurately. 
VI. DIRECT ASSIGNMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SUBROGATION 
 Our discussion thus far has focused on the doctrine of 
subrogation as a means of reducing the reliance of refinancing 
lenders on title insurance. However, there is an alternative to the 
subrogation doctrine for passing on the priority of the old mortgage 
to the refinancing lender: a direct, written assignment of the old 
mortgage to the new lender. If a widespread practice of giving such 
assignments were established, it would have the same effect as 
subrogation, but without the quibbles about notice of, and prejudice 
to, intervening lienors discussed above.149 After such an assignment, 
the refinancing lender could amend the promissory note (and the 
mortgage if necessary) to reflect the change in the loan’s terms—
typically a lower interest rate. Since neither the assignment nor the 
lowering of the interest rate150 would impair the mortgage’s priority, 
the refinancing lender’s retention of the original priority against 
intervening lienors would be assured. 
However, so far as we know, the granting of an assignment by 
the old lender to the refinancing lender is a common practice only in 
the state of New York. Oddly, the New York practice of assigning 
mortgages to be refinanced was not established as a way of ensuring 
the priority of the new lender’s position but as a way of avoiding the 
state’s extremely burdensome mortgage recording tax.151 No one 
 
http://www.nccusl.org/update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-urpera.asp (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2006). 
 149. See supra notes 37–43, 46–67 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
 151. The recording tax is assessed on a complex schedule and depends on the amount of 
the mortgage, whether the property is a one-to-two-family residence and whether the property 
1NELSON.FIN 9/5/2006 11:48 AM 
305] Adopting Restatement Mortgage Subrogation Principles 
 349 
ever seems to have considered assignment as a way to preserve the 
original mortgage’s priority and thereby avoid the necessity of a new 
title examination or new title insurance. 
Refinancings (as well as financings for real estate sales) are often 
handled in New York by use of a “Consolidation, Extension, and 
Modification Agreement” (“CEM”), which serves both to assign the 
mortgage and to restate its terms as necessary.152 While New York 
lenders whose loans are being paid off have no legal obligation to 
facilitate this sort of transaction153 unless the terms of their 
mortgages require them to do so, many cooperate voluntarily, but 
only if they receive a fee—usually in the range of $200 to $1000 
with a median of perhaps $600.154 
 
is located in New York City, Yonkers, or other parts of the state. In the worst case, for 
nonresidential properties within New York City, the tax is 2.75% of the mortgage amount. 
Even for one-to-two-family residential properties with mortgages under $500,000 in New 
York City, the tax is 2% of the mortgage amount, less $25. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 253 
(McKinney 2005). The mortgagee pays 0.25% of the tax, and the remainder is paid by the 
mortgagor. Id. at 1-a(a). The schedule is set out graphically in a convenient form at 
http://www.empireabstract.com/taxinfo.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006). The rationale for 
use of the assignment as a mortgage tax avoidance device is spelled out in Petition No. 
M991230A, New York Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, Advisory Opinion (Feb. 25, 
2000), available at http://www.tax.state.ny.us/pdf/advisory_opinions/mortgage/ 
a00_1r.pdf. 
 152. The rationale for the form is explained at http://www.freddiemac.com/cim/pdf/ 
nycemaqa.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The text of the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac-approved 
CEM form appears at http://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/ 
specialpurpose/pdf/3172.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The form provided by the New York 
Board of Title Underwriters appears at http://www22.inetba.com/newyorktitle/filecabinet/ 
Consolidation_Extension.pdf (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
 153. An earlier New York statute, former N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 275, captioned 
“Assignment of mortgage required in lieu of certificate or discharge,” enacted by Chapter 408 
of the Laws of 1914, required lenders to execute such assignments. However, it was repealed 
by Chapter 241, Laws of 1989. See Michael J. Berey, Legislation Addresses Mortgage, N.Y. L.J., 
Aug. 24, 1998, at S6. 
It is quite arguable that when a mortgage loan is paid in full by someone who is not 
primarily responsible for payment, the payor is entitled to an assignment as a matter of law. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.6 cmt. a (1997); see also Payne v. Foster, 
135 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. App. Div. 1954) (payment by holder of remainder); Simonson v. 
Lauck, 93 N.Y.S. 965 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905) (payment by a third party at the request of a 
tenant in common of the real estate); Global Realty Corp. v. Charles Kannel Corp., 170 
N.Y.S.2d 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1958) (payment by junior tenant). However, none of the 
authorities cited recognize any corresponding right when payment is made by the mortgagor 
rather than a third party. 
 154. Cooperation is more likely between institutional lenders since their mortgage forms 
are likely to be mutually acceptable. With respect to the amount of the fee, see Hillary 
Potashnick, Mortgages and Co-op Loans, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS & CLOSINGS 
2004, 140; PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE NEW YORK PRACTICE SKILLS COURSE HANDBOOK 
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On its face, this New York practice should make a new title 
insurance policy entirely unnecessary when a mortgage loan is 
refinanced, at least if the loan balance is not increased. It is, after all, 
the same mortgage with the same priority as when it was originated, 
and the title insurance protection runs with the mortgage.155 
Nonetheless, refinancing lenders in New York typically insist on a 
new title insurance policy even when the old mortgage is assigned to 
them. If the loan balance is not increased, the demand for a new title 
policy (at the mortgagor’s expense, of course) seems entirely 
unwarranted. The cost to the mortgagor is far from trivial and will 
usually exceed $1000 for a residential refinancing.156 
 
SERIES 321, 330 (2004). Citibank charges $650. See https://www.citimortgage.com/ 
ServicingWebStatic/faq/faq_payoff.jsp#Payoff7 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). The fee is 
ostensibly to cover the original lender’s costs in preparing and delivering the CEM Agreement, 
but it seems fairly obvious that this explanation is a sham. The lender, after all, has an 
obligation to discharge the mortgage of record unless a CEM Agreement is requested, and 
there is no reason to suppose that executing and delivering the CEM costs the lender more 
than executing and recording the discharge. The fee is charged simply because lenders know 
the mortgagor’s only alternative to obtaining the CEM is to pay the mortgage recording tax 
on the amount of the new loan. In light of the fact that the tax can cost many thousands of 
dollars, lenders have more than ample leverage to exact a fee of hundreds of dollars for the 
CEM Agreement. According to the National Association of Realtors, the median sale price of a 
residential unit in the New York City/northern New Jersey metropolitan area in 2004 was 
$385,900. See http://www.realtor.org/Research.nsf/files/REL05Q4T.pdf/$FILE/ 
REL05Q4T.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2006). If an average mortgage of 80% of value, or about 
$320,000, is assumed, the mortgage tax (at 2% minus $25) would be $6375. It is easy to see 
why property owners who refinance would prefer to pay the old lender’s fee for the CEM 
Agreement. 
 155. For example, the American Land Title Association’s 1992 Loan Policy, available at 
http://www.alta.org/forms/loan.doc (last visited Jan. 21, 2006), defines “insured” to include 
“the owner of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage and each successor in 
ownership of the indebtedness.” Id. at Conditions and Stipulations 1(a)(i). 
The intent of the first definition of “insured” in the ALTA loan policies is to insure 
the mortgage lien both while the loan is held by the original lender and when the 
loan is sold to an assignee in the secondary mortgage market. Such assignee does 
not have to be named as an insured in the policy’s Schedule A or added by a 
subsequent endorsement. 
JOYCE PALOMAR, TITLE INSURANCE LAW § 4.9 (Release 3, 2005) (footnote omitted). 
 156. For a refinanced mortgage of $320,000, a typical amount as estimated in supra note 
159. In the Bronx or Queens, the premium rate for a mortgagee’s title insurance policy would 
be $344 for the first $35,000 of coverage plus $3.64 per $1,000 of additional coverage, or a 
total premium of $1381. These rates are provided by the New York Title Insurance Rate 
Service and are found at http://www.nytitle.com/contact.ivnu (last visited Dec. 17, 2005). 
A discounted “reissue rate” is available in some circumstances. The New York Title 
Insurance Rate Service website states, 
A Refinance or Subordinate Mortgage Policy issued within ten years of a previously 
insured Mortgage or fee interest where the premises are identical, there has been no 
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In an effort to discover why new title insurance is thought 
necessary when a mortgage is assigned for refinancing in New York, 
we secured the assistance of a prominent New York City real estate 
practitioner in raising the question with a group of about 125 other 
real estate lawyers who belong to an email Listserv.157 We found the 
answers to be underwhelming.158 On the whole, we were left with 
 
change of ownership, and the amount is less than $250,000 shall be charged 50% of 
the Mortgage Rate on the liability up to the amount of the existing indebtedness 
and 100% of the Mortgage Rate on any liability in excess of the existing 
indebtedness. 
Id.; see also James M. Orphanides & S.H. Spencer Compton, New Advances and Tools for 
Lenders and Counsel in Title Insurance, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, COMMERCIAL REAL 
ESTATE FINANCING 2004: WHAT BORROWERS & LENDERS NEED TO KNOW NOW 545, 555 
(2004). 
It is entirely possible that the mortgagor will not be informed of the reissue rate and will 
pay the full rate despite the theoretical availability of the discount. See In re Coordinated Title 
Ins. Cases, 2004 WL 690380, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 2004) (certifying a class action 
against eight New York title insurance companies charging them with fraud and deceptive 
business conduct for failing to advise mortgagors of the reissue rate); Kenneth R. Harney, Title 
Insurance “Reissue Rates” Spark Class Action Suits, Controversy, REALTY TIMES, Apr. 14, 2003, 
available at http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/20030414_reissuerates.htm (last visited Feb. 
23, 2006). 
 157. The attorney who assisted us was Joshua Stein of the New York City office of 
Latham and Watkins. We are grateful for his help. 
 158. The basic answers were as follows: 
1. The new title insurance has the advantage of insuring the validity of the assignment 
itself—something that the original title insurance obviously cannot do. This is correct, but it is 
difficult to give it any serious weight. An assignment of a mortgage is, as between the parties, 
largely an unnecessary document. Anyone who acquires the right to enforce the debt will 
automatically be regarded as having the right to enforce the mortgage as well. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4(a) (1997) (“A transfer of an obligation 
secured by a mortgage also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree 
otherwise.”); see also Johnson v. Hart, 3 Johns. Cas. 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803). Hence, if the 
assignee acquires the promissory note, the risk of the mortgage assignment’s being held invalid 
is so remote as to be trivial. 
2. If the original mortgagor and mortgagee had modified the mortgage’s terms before 
making the assignment, the assignee might be subject to a risk of partial loss of priority. Once 
again, the observation is correct, but the problem seems extremely minor and easy to manage. 
If the lender who takes the assignment is unaware of the modification and merely inspects the 
original mortgage and note, there is no risk at all, since under applicable law, it is precisely the 
terms of those documents that will continue to have full priority over any intervening liens. If 
the lender who accepts the assignment is relying on the modified terms of the mortgage, it can 
only be because that lender is fully aware of the modification. In that (relatively rare) case, if 
the modification was not within the scope of any future advance clause, the assignee may well 
wish to obtain a new title insurance policy—in effect, to ensure that there are no intervening 
interests to whose holders priority might be lost. 
3. Mortgagee title insurance policies routinely exclude coverage for title defects 
“created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured” and for matters “not known to the 
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the impression that although the advantages of new title insurance 
were marginal at best, lenders and their counsel saw little reason to 
change the present practice because the cost of the new title 
insurance could so easily be passed on to borrowers. 
The industry’s attitude is disheartening but perhaps unsurprising. 
We are dealing with traditional practices that are not readily 
susceptible to change through “jawboning.” The only likely 
motivator of change will be an altered understanding of the 
competitive forces of the market on the part of refinancing lenders. 
We believe that such a change may well occur,159 but until it does, 
we do not think it fruitful to recommend or argue for adoption of a 
widespread national practice of making written mortgage 
assignments a part of residential refinancings. Doing so would entail 
major changes in the flow of documents in areas of the nation 
outside New York, would require retraining of personnel, and would 
inevitably involve significant startup costs. Moreover, for the change 
in practice to be effective, it would require adoption by a large 
number of lenders. There is no existing entity with the overarching 
authority necessary to require or even encourage such a change. 
Without question, some lenders would resist change on grounds of a 
short-term cost increase. Despite its theoretical advantages over 
subrogation, we have reluctantly discarded assignment. Subrogation, 
 
Company, not recorded in the public records at Date of Policy, but known to the insured 
claimant and not disclosed in writing to the Company.” AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASS’N, 1992 
LOAN POLICY, EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE 3, available at http://www.alta.org/forms/ 
loan.doc (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). If the original mortgagee knew of, or agreed to, a title 
defect, would that knowledge or agreement be imputed to an assignee of the mortgage so as to 
bar it from recovering on the policy for that title defect? Superficially this appears to be a 
legitimate concern of the refinancing lender, but almost certainly it is not. The reason is that 
knowledge or act of the original insured cannot properly be imputed to the assignee. See S. 
Title Ins. Co. v. Crow, 278 So. 2d 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), in which the court 
immediately saw through this sort of defense by the title insurer. It held: 
[The policy] excludes defects “known to the insured Claimant.” Appellant reads this 
as if it said “named insured,” and that is the fallacy in its argument. There is no 
claim that either of the “insured claimants” knew of the defect, and while the 
defense might be good against the original insured, it is not available against the 
[assignees], who took without notice of the defective title. 
Id. at 295. But see Countrywide Homes, Inc. v. Lafonte, No. 14265/01, 2003 WL 1389089 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 13, 2003) (An unreported New York case taking the contrary view—
imputing the original mortgagee’s knowledge of a mortgage defect to the assignee. This 
holding and result seem plainly wrong.). 
 159. See infra text accompanying notes 186–195 (describing the increasing 
competitiveness in the residential mortgage market). 
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by contrast, imposes no added costs on lenders and requires no 
changes in the flow of paperwork, and the broad Restatement view 
of subrogation is already well on its way to becoming the 
predominant view nationally. 
VII. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE RESTATEMENT APPROACH 
We have argued above that a liberal view of mortgage 
subrogation would result in a major reduction in the cost of title 
proof in refinancing transactions.160 In this Part, we consider who 
will benefit from that reduction. There are several possibilities. The 
title insurance industry might become more profitable as a major 
cost of doing business is eliminated. On the other hand, the rule 
might inure to the benefit of homeowners in the form of lower title 
insurance premiums as title insurers are forced by competitive 
pressures to pass their savings on in the form of lowered premiums. 
Alternatively, mortgage lenders might decide to become self-insurers 
of title in the refinancing context, dropping the requirement for title 
insurance altogether, with an accompanying cost saving for 
homeowners. 
To gain a better perspective on these important questions, we 
conducted conversations with a variety of executives representing 
major title insurance companies and mortgage lenders from all 
geographic areas of the country.161 They were extremely helpful and 
forthcoming with their insights. In part, this was because they were 
assured that their comments would not be quoted with personal 
attribution. Their comments were unanimous in one important 
respect—they supported either judicial or legislative adoption of the 
Restatement subrogation rule. This is hardly surprising, since the 
rule dramatically reduces the financial risk to lenders and title 
insurers posed by intervening lienors in the refinancing context. 
However, when the focus turned to whether the uniform 
adoption of the Restatement approach would yield significant savings 
to homeowners in the form of lower title insurance premiums, there 
 
 160. See supra text accompanying notes 123–139. 
 161. Ten individuals were interviewed during the summer and fall of 2004. They were 
selected on the basis of the authors’ personal acquaintance with them or with others who could 
provide introductions to them. No claim is made that they represent the mortgage and title 
industries as a whole, but all were highly knowledgeable and familiar with industry conditions 
in their areas of the nation. Because they were being asked questions whose answers could 
potentially be highly useful to their competitors, all were promised anonymity. 
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was far less unanimity. A large minority of our contacts believed that 
the national adoption of the Restatement approach would bring 
substantial and relatively immediate consumer savings. Others, 
making up a slight majority, were much more guarded in their 
responses. Some in this latter category foresaw small, incremental 
savings to consumers while others predicted virtually no short-term 
change in refinancing title insurance rates and relatively modest long-
term reductions. 
While we initially found these responses somewhat perplexing, 
our discussions revealed several important considerations that may 
account for much of the disparity of views. Several respondents who 
foresaw little impact on consumer costs emphasized governmental 
regulation of title insurance premium rates. The degree of state 
regulation varies widely from state to state. A few states have virtually 
no rate regulation.162 Many other states follow a “file and use” 
approach; in these jurisdictions, title insurers file their rate schedules 
with the appropriate state agency and they become effective within 
fifteen to thirty days.163 Others are categorized as “file and use and 
justify”; these states impose an additional requirement on insurers to 
“justify” their rates.164 While in some of these latter two types of 
jurisdictions, the insurer’s rate decision is virtually incontestable, in 
others, the state agency may sometimes challenge a proposed rate 
change. More extensive regulatory restrictions are found in “file for 
approval” states. In such states, the regulatory agency must review 
rate filings to determine that they do not violate state substantive 
restrictions.165 Finally, a few states are classified as “regulatory rate-
 
 162. Our research reveals that seven states have no rate regulation of title insurance 
premiums. These states include Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Oklahoma, 
and West Virginia. In addition, Iowa does not permit the writing of title insurance within the 
state. 
 163. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-25-6 (2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-376 (2002); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-11-118 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.22-020 (2001); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.2406, 500.7312 (West 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. § 692A.120(3) 
(2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-35-111 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-19A-209 (2005); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 48.29.140 (West 1999). 
 164. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.66.370, 21.66.380 (2004); CAL. INS. CODE §§ 
12401.1, 12401.2 (West 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:46B-42, 17:46B-43 (West 1994); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 58-40-30 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3935.04 (West 2002); 40 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 910-37, 910-38 (West 1999). 
 165. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-419 (West 2000); IDAHO CODE § 41-2706 
(2003); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 22-101 (West 2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-75-980 (2002); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-23-326 (2005). 
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setting”; a state regulatory agency sets title insurance rates in these 
jurisdictions.166 
To the extent that states either mandate or heavily regulate title 
insurance rates, the market is likely to be slower to react to risk-
reducing legal changes than in states where title underwriters are 
relatively free to set rates. Two of our contacts indicated that it 
would take “years” to see premium reductions in heavily regulated 
states. On the other hand, where states allow title insurers greater 
flexibility in rate-setting, competition among title insurers is much 
more likely to put more immediate downward pressure on rates. 
Some of the pessimism about the rate-reduction potential of the 
Restatement rules is attributable to the fact that several of our 
contacts were from states having heavy regulation. 
However, this pessimism may be overstated. If competitive 
pressures force title insurers to lower refinancing premiums in states 
with low regulation, it seems unlikely that rates will lag inordinately 
in heavy regulation jurisdictions. This is because both title insurance 
underwriters and major mortgage lenders are national in their 
operations. For example, assume that a major lender like Bank of 
America obtains a substantial reduction in refinancing title insurance 
rates in California (where there is great flexibility for the industry to 
make rate reductions). The bank is unlikely to permit those rates to 
continue indefinitely higher in Florida, where the regulatory regime 
normally makes rates much harder to change. We suspect that a title 
insurer that wants to keep Bank of America’s business on a national 
basis will be under significant pressure to file promptly for a rate 
reduction in Florida and to pursue the matter vigorously with that 
state’s regulators. Moreover, if the title insurer that applies for the 
rate reduction can show that its risk has been significantly reduced by 
modernization of the subrogation doctrine, the regulators should 
have a significant incentive to endorse the rate reduction. 
Another factor that some of our contacts believed would restrict 
the potential for a significant reduction in title insurance rates was 
the fact that industry claims losses167 are a relatively small percentage 
of total premiums collected. For example, these percentages were 
 
 166. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.782 (West 2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-30-6 (LexisNexis 
2004); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 9.07 (Vernon 1981). 
 167. The term “losses” includes loss-adjustment expense, which refers to attorneys fees, 
court costs, investigation expenses, and other costs associated with payment and settlement of 
claims. 
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5.3%, 4.8%, 4.6%, 4.0%, and 4.5% for the years 2000–2004 
respectively.168 The argument is that if overall claims paid are 
relatively low, a change in mortgage subrogation law to better 
protect refinancing lenders and their insurers can have, at most, only 
a modest impact on title insurance rates. 
There is a good reason why these percentages are so low as 
compared, for example, with the property/casualty insurance 
industry, where the analogous ratio of claims paid to premiums 
collected averaged 80.4% for most of the same period.169 The reason 
is that a great deal of the money charged for title insurance goes into 
risk reduction rather than claims payment. As one analyst has noted: 
 Title insurers sell protection against losses caused by problems 
with title . . . arising out of events that occurred before the effective 
date of the policy. Because most uncertainty about the past can be 
reduced by careful research, a title insurer can exert a great deal of 
control over the risks it underwrites.  
 . . . .  
 Consequently, title insurers operate by collecting premiums, 
much of which are used to cover the underwriting costs associated 
with the issuance of a title insurance policy. Therefore, in contrast 
to property and casualty insurers, title insurers expend premium 
dollars before collection and therefore do not retain most of the 
premium dollar before it is expended in the ordinary course of 
business.170 
Stated another way, title insurers have relatively low claims payouts 
because they expend large amounts on personnel and infrastructure 
costs before losses occur. 
However, significant reductions in premiums should result from 
our proposed change in the law because its implementation should 
 
 168. Gary A. Davis & Richard McCarthy, Title Industry Running on All Cylinders, A.M. 
BEST SPECIAL REPORT, October 4, 2004, at 9 (covering 2000–2003 reporting years), 
available at http://www.alta.org/industry/AMBest04.pdf; see also American Land Title 
Association, Annual Statement for the year 2004 of the American Land Title Association 
Industry, at 3, available at http://www.alta.org/industry/TitleInsurInd04.pdf (covering 
2004 reporting year); see also Demotech, Inc., Title Insurance Industry Information & 
Economic Data 2003 Year in Review: Solving Tomorrow’s Insurance Challenges Today, June 
2004, http://www.demotech.com/pdf/PTIC/2003_Year_in_Review.pdf. 
 169. Davis & McCarthy, supra note 168, at 9. 
 170. Id. at 8–9. 
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permit a substantial reduction in both the title insurance industry’s 
underwriting costs and its loss payouts.171 Under our proposal, where 
the refinancing loan does not involve an increased principal amount, 
or the increased principal is covered by a future advances clause, the 
risk of losing priority to intervening interests is virtually eliminated. 
Consequently, if the same title company that wrote the original loan 
policy writes the refinance insurance, it may no longer be necessary 
for the title company to conduct any new title search whatever. 
Moreover, even where the refinancing involves “cash out” to the 
borrower, the title company’s search may be more cursory and the 
need for close evaluation of the results less compelling. As we 
stressed earlier, lenders require title insurance in refinancing 
transactions largely because of a concern that intervening liens and 
similar interests will trump their new mortgages.172 The title industry 
itself emphasizes this as the most important risk.173 If the law is 
changed so that a refinancing lender is subrogated in every instance 
up to the amount of the mortgage that it replaces, then the most 
important component of title risk in the typical refinancing 
transaction will have been obviated.174 Of course, the Restatement 
approach will not protect the lender to the extent that the refinanced 
debt is increased unless that increase is within the scope of a future 
advances clause.175 However, as we explained earlier, the typical 
 
 171. One can think of underwriting expenses as falling into two major categories: 
maintenance of a “title plant” (a set of records reflecting all recorded transactions) and the 
personnel cost involved in searching in the plant. Subrogation will not affect the first of these 
expenses, but it should result in a major curtailment of the second, as searches for intervening 
liens become unnecessary in refinancing transactions. 
 172. See supra text accompanying notes 33–36. 
 173. In response to the question why a homeowner must pay for a refinancing lender’s 
title policy, the American Land Title Association responds: 
Even if you recently purchased or refinanced your home, there are some problems 
that could arise with the title. For instance, you might have incurred a mechanics 
lien from a contractor who claims he/she has not been paid. Or you might have a 
judgment placed on your house due to unpaid taxes, homeowner dues, or child 
support for instance. The lender needs reassurance that the title to the property they 
are financing is clear. 
American Land Title Association, Questions About Title Insurance, http://www.alta.org/ 
consumer/questions.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2006). 
 174. Title insurance also protects the refinancing lender against other relatively minor 
risks; for example, that one of the borrower’s signatures on the new mortgage was forged. In 
addition, the cost of the title policy may include loan closing services to the lender. See supra 
text accompanying notes 122–148. 
 175. See supra text accompanying notes 92–107. 
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“cash out” amount is relatively small compared to the average 
homeowner’s equity and generally results in a very low-risk loan-to-
value ratio.176 Even without a future advances clause, lenders may 
also consider the risk of loss of priority for the additionally-financed 
amount without an additional title examination to be insubstantial. 
Such a significant legal change would not go unnoticed by the 
lending industry. Large institutional lenders are sophisticated 
consumers, and they will realize that one of the title insurer’s major 
risks has been eliminated. Even now, with the protection afforded by 
the law of subrogation far from uniform, lenders doubtless are aware 
that title insurance underwriting efforts are less intense in refinances 
than in the context of a home purchase-money mortgage. The title 
insurance industry concedes that this is so: 
 In underwriting refinance transactions, the title insurer or its 
agent performs a more limited title search than is necessary for a 
resale transaction. This less comprehensive title search occurs 
because only the position of the lender of the refinanced mortgage 
has to be determined to assure the lender of its priority.177 
Lenders compete constantly for loan customers, and they are 
highly sensitive to the costs they impose on those customers. Once 
the lending industry realizes that the risk to the title insurance 
industry in insuring refinancings is largely obviated by modernization 
of the subrogation doctrine, it is likely to put substantial market 
pressure on title insurers to lower their premiums substantially. This 
pressure on title insurance companies will come in an economic 
environment that already is highly competitive. While refinancing 
premiums have been important to the overall economic health of the 
title insurance industry,178 it is now under serious pressure to reduce 
 
 176. See supra text accompanying notes 56–60. 
 177. Davis & McCarthy, supra note 168, at 11. 
 178. Refinancing premiums as a percentage of total title insurance premium revenues vary 
substantially depending on whether mortgage interest rates are falling or rising. In periods of 
sharply declining rates, refinancings increase substantially and total premiums rise, often 
dramatically. See supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. Refinanced mortgages averaged 
60% of all one-to-four-family mortgage originations for the period 2001–2003. See Mortgage 
Bankers Association, 1-to-4 Family Mortgage Originations 1990–2003, 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/marketdata/data/03/1-4_originations.html (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2006). The converse is true when interest rates are rising. The refinancing share of 
premium revenues has generally varied from a low of 20% to a high of 60% over the past several 
years. As of this writing, our information indicates that 40–50% of premium income is 
attributable to refinancing. See E-mail from Denise Warren, Director of Investor Relations, 
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those premiums, which are already substantially lower than for new 
purchase mortgages.179 Major institutional lenders continue to 
negotiate significantly lower bulk rate premium packages, and some 
major title insurers are already planning further major reductions.180 
In the final analysis, the title insurance industry can endure a 
significant reduction in refinance premiums. The past several years 
have been highly profitable for the industry. As one leading analyst 
of the industry summarized, “[t]he title industry reported record 
results in 2003 for the second consecutive year, as performance 
continued to improve and it benefited from favorable economic 
conditions. The industry’s strong revenue generation was due to 
improved loss experience, enhanced operating efficiencies and the 
continued booming housing market.”181 As the refinancing boom 
comes to an end, the industry’s revenues will undoubtedly fall, and 
the increasing availability of subrogation will force them to fall 
 
First American Corporation, to Benjamin Gardner, Research Assistant to Professor Grant 
Nelson (June 10, 2005) (on file with author) (estimating the current percentage to be 40%); 
Telephone Interview by Benjamin Gardner with the Head Title Officer of a leading title 
insurer (June 13, 2005) (notes in possession of author) (estimating the current percentage to 
be 45–50%). The highest estimated percentage during the past decade was over 80%. Id. 
 179. The primary reason is the operation of so-called “reissue rates,” which in effect 
represent discounts for issuance of a new title policy by a company that wrote a prior policy on 
the same real estate within some fixed time period. See, e.g., First American Corporation, 2004 
Annual report Issue: Management’s Discussion and Analysis, BUSINESS NOW: THE MAGAZINE 
OF CORPORATE SUCCESS, at 17, available at http://www.firstam.com/faf/ir/pdf/annual-rpt-
04.pdf (last visited Jan. 28, 2006); Stewart Information Services Corporation, Defining Our 
Future, Building Our Business: 2004 Annual Report, Feb. 16, 2005, at 21, available at 
http://www.stewart.com/docs/Stewart_04AR.pdf. 
 180. One major insurer has lowered those premiums 30% from an already discounted 
base. See First American Does One-Rate, 29 NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS 8, Apr. 18, 2005, § 30. 
One of our industry interviewees reported that a major title insurer had agreed to give a large 
institutional lender a bulk rate of $275 for residential refinance policies that normally would 
carry a $750 premium. 
 181. Davis & McCarthy, supra note 173, at 1. This analysis further explains: 
Following record earnings generated in the previous year, the title industry reported 
robust earnings in 2003 for the eighth consecutive year. The industry reported 
pretax operating gains, including net investment income, of approximately $1.5 
billion for 2003, which was a staggering 87% higher than 2002. This record 
performance was driven by strong underwriting results, growth in operating revenue 
and an increase in net investment income attributed to a mounting invested asset 
base. Growth in operating revenue reflected a surge in demand for title products, as 
lower interest rates fueled refinance activity and strong home sales. While total 
operating revenue in 2003 exceeded the prior year’s record by 31%, the industry was 
able to absorb this large influx of new business more efficiently, primarily due to 
technological advancements. 
Id. 
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farther. However, subrogation will also reduce operating costs, 
cushioning the revenue drop. 
A major change is also occurring in the market for home 
mortgages. For a number of years, lenders have granted home equity 
loans while imposing only minor settlement costs, or none at all, on 
consumer borrowers.182 Lenders simply internalized those costs, 
reflecting them in the overall interest rate return. Now, for the first 
time, lenders are seriously examining a similar approach to first 
mortgage lending. This is a radical departure from past practice, 
under which lenders making first mortgage loans imposed numerous 
“junk fees” (in addition to the arguably legitimate cost of title 
insurance, credit reports, and the few other fees required for actual 
services from outside providers).183 The lending industry widely 
understood that the “junk fee” approach was intended to confuse 
consumers, make price comparisons among lenders difficult, and 
frustrate the sort of vigorous shopping that the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act was designed to encourage.184 
The new trend, however, seems to signify a recognition by home 
mortgage lenders that confusing and frustrating their customers may, 
in the long run, be poor business strategy. Instead, lenders are 
beginning to roll all fees and charges into a single interest rate and a 
single loan fee.185 Without doubt this will facilitate price competition 
 
 182. Kenneth R. Harney, No-Cost Equity-Style Loans Come to Primary Mortgages, WASH. 
POST, May 6, 2005, at F01. 
 183. HUD defined “junk fees” as “any fee charged for a service to a borrower that has 
little or no value in relation to the charge, and/or may be duplicative, to increase a loan 
originator’s profits.” Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,134, 49,136 n.6 
(proposed July 29, 2002) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 3500). 
 184. It was precisely for this reason—the ineffectiveness of RESPA in making loan and 
settlement costs “shoppable”—that HUD issued its Guaranteed Mortgage Package Agreement 
proposal. See supra note 138. As HUD put it, “[A]n exemption should be provided for 
packaging to facilitate earlier comparison shopping by borrowers, greater competition among 
mortgage lenders and others, and guaranteed prices to borrowers from the time the borrower 
applies for a mortgage through settlement.” Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 49,145 n.35. In effect, the proposal signified HUD’s admission that RESPA had failed. 
See Kenneth A. Markison, HUD’s Proposal To Overhaul the Mortgage Process To Lower Costs and 
Increase Homeownership, 12 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 62, 63 (2002). 
185. Beginning in May, 2005, 
Bank of America [began] offering what it calls its ‘Mortgage Rewards’ plan, which 
essentially brings its streamlined, zero-cost equity line program to people shopping 
for primary mortgages to buy homes. Initially it will [sic] available in 20 states, 
including Maryland and Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Mortgage industry 
sources say other large, well-known banks are developing their own versions . . . . 
Harney, supra note 182. 
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simply because it is far easier for consumers to shop the market for a 
single fee than for a multiplicity of complex fees. 
This new approach to marketing by residential lenders is largely a 
product of the growth in consumer use of the Internet. Because the 
Internet makes the gathering of information significantly less costly 
and more convenient than in the past,186 providers of a wide variety 
of goods and services have become more competitive in terms of 
price.187 In the primary mortgage market, a consumer who wishes to 
gather information about the interest rates and loan fees of, say, ten 
lenders can do so in a few minutes at the computer rather than 
spending several hours on the telephone.188 Moreover, it has become 
practical for consumers to consider lenders across the nation, rather 
than only those with local offices.189 In these conditions, lenders who 
frustrate and confuse their potential customers with lengthy lists of 
 
 186. The costs of storing, transmitting, and processing information have been dropping 
continuously by 25 to 35% per year for the last 30 years, and that trend is expected to continue 
for at least the next 5 to 10 years. See Till M. Guldimann, How Technology Is Reshaping Finance 
and Risks, BUS. ECON., Jan. 2000, at 41, 44. As one analyst noted, 
Consumers view financial products, including mortgages, to be commodities with 
only the price differentiating product offerings. And many consumers have ready 
access to price information via the Internet. Market research shows that consumers 
are becoming impatient with firms that fail to provide convenience and access to 
innovative products and that lack the ability to execute transactions quickly. 
Forrest Pafenberg, The Single-Family Mortgage Industry in the Internet Era: Technology 
Developments and Market Structure, at 28 (2004), http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/ 
technology paper12004.pdf (footnotes omitted). 
 187. “Today’s home mortgage market is highly securitized and competitive, bolstered by 
government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Large mortgage lenders 
have adopted high-volume, low-cost strategies based on highly automated systems, resulting in 
strong price competition.” Jeffery W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore, Small Banks’ Competitors 
Loom Large, SOUTHWEST ECON., Jan.–Feb. 2004, available at 
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/swe/2004/swe0401b.html.; see also Jane Bryant Quinn, 
Cutting the Commissions, NEWSWEEK, July 18, 2005, at 47 (describing how the Internet has 
made the market for residential real estate brokerage services more price competitive). 
 188. See Online Shopping for Mortgages, BANKRATE.COM, Mar. 15, 2004, 
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/real-estate/buyerguide2004/online-mortgage.asp; 
Broderick Perkins, Online Mortgage Shopping Today, REALTY TIMES, Jan. 23, 2004, 
http://realtytimes.com/rtcpages/20040123_webshop.htm. Online mortgage shopping sites 
that access multiple lenders simultaneously include www.nextag.com, www.theloanpage.com, 
www.finance.yahoo.com, www.lendingtree.com, and www.eloan.com. Many individual lenders 
also provide on-line rate quotes and loan applications. See, e.g., http://www.flagstar.com/ 
lending/mortgage/refinance. 
 189. “The other favorable trend has been a transformation of the mortgage industry. To 
get a loan twenty years ago, you usually went to a local bank or savings association, which 
approved the application and provided the money. Now, the mortgage business is mostly 
national.” Robert J. Samuelson, Is Housing a New Bubble?, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 55. 
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miscellaneous charges for the loan and ancillary services simply 
cannot survive in the long run. All-inclusive loan quotes, in which 
the consumer need only consider a single interest rate and a single 
loan fee, will almost certainly predominate in the future. Thus far, 
the new programs adopted by lenders have not included title 
insurance, primarily because title insurance rates are regulated, and 
therefore the lending industry cannot bargain them down as quickly 
and effectively as other costs. But as we have suggested above,190 this 
is surely a temporary limitation. If lenders cannot get title insurance 
expenses down to acceptable levels, they are likely to dispense with 
title insurance entirely, becoming self-insurers. The Restatement 
approach to mortgage subrogation will make such decisions possible 
by greatly reducing—indeed, virtually eliminating—the risks of self-
insurance.191 
The requirements of the two federally sponsored secondary 
mortgage market purchasers, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,192 
comprise a major element in the equation of residential refinancing. 
These two congressionally chartered corporations purchase huge 
numbers of residential mortgages from local lenders.193 They then 
either hold the mortgages in their portfolios or securitize them.194 
Most lenders want to preserve the option of selling their loans to 
these two entities and, hence, comply with their guidelines in every 
residential loan they make. At present, both Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac insist that a new title insurance policy be issued on every new 
loan.195 Hence, lenders are quite unlikely to decide to self-insure title 
 
 190. See supra text accompanying notes 162–166. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 122–147 for a discussion of the remaining risks. 
 192. For a discussion of the vast scope of the influence of these two entities, see 
Economist.com, Building the American dream . . . or Nightmare?, THE ECONOMIST GLOBAL 
AGENDA, Feb. 18, 2005, http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id 
=3686475.  
 193. Together, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchased 54% of the residential mortgages 
originated in the United States in 2003 and 51% of those originated in 2002. Office of Federal 
Housing Enterprise Oversight, Mortgage Markets and the Enterprises in 2003, Oct. 2004, at 
12, http://www.ofheo.gov/media/pdf/MME2003.pdf. 
 194. See Freddie Mac, Our Business, http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/about/ 
what_we_do/business.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2006). 
 195. See, e.g., Fannie Mae Selling Guide, Part V, Ch. 2, Title Insurance, Dec. 4, 1998, 
http://www.allregs.com/efnma/ (“The lender must assure that title insurance that satisfies 
our requirements is in place before a mortgage is delivered to us for purchase or securitization. 
The title insurance policy must ensure full title protection to us.”); Fannie Mae, Refinancing 
Costs Refinancing Requirements: & Costs, http://www.fanniemae.com/homebuyers/ 
findamortgage/refinancing/requirements.jhtml (last visited Jan. 30, 2006); Freddie Mac, 
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to refinancing mortgages until Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac decide 
to do so as well. However, a decision along these lines seems quite 
feasible; indeed, there are a number of states in which the two 
government-sponsored agencies could eliminate their title insurance 
requirements for refinance mortgages today. As the Restatement 
subrogation rule spreads to additional jurisdictions, the two 
secondary market agencies could (and we believe, should) 
accordingly make available an exemption from the title insurance 
requirement. 
In sum, we believe that adoption of the Restatement approach to 
subrogation and related issues will greatly reduce, if not eliminate, 
the title risk in mortgage refinancings and will create compelling 
pressures on title insurance companies to respond with substantially 
lower premiums. This change should enable the industry to achieve 
major savings in underwriting costs. To be sure, the regulatory 
regime for title insurance may retard competition in some parts of 
the country. However, given the market strength of the major 
institutional lenders and the growing price competition in both the 
mortgage and the title insurance markets, it seems highly likely that 
the proposed legal changes will dramatically benefit lenders and their 
homeowner clientele. Should the title insurance industry resist 
significant premium reduction, it will face a lending industry whose 
members will be increasingly willing to self-insure. 
VIII. CHANGING SUBROGATION LAW: IS THE SOLUTION 
STATE OR FEDERAL? 
This Article demonstrates that the pervasive adoption of the 
Restatement approach to subrogation and related priority issues in 
refinancing transactions is correct as a normative matter and likely to 
lead to substantial savings for refinancing homeowners. We consider 
here the optimal way to proceed in order to allow this adoption to 
become reality. We are, of course, heartened that the recent trend of 
case law has been favorable to the Restatement approach.196 The 
continuation of that trend is desirable if homeowners are to receive 
substantial savings when they refinance. However, state-by-state 
judicial adoption of a Restatement rule can be a tedious and uneven 
 
Review Checklist for Final Delivery Electronic Mortgage Documents, May 6, 2005, 
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/multifamily/docs/specialproductschecklist.doc. 
 196. See supra note 39. 
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process, likely to extend over many years. Even more problematic 
would be an attempt by the National Conference of Commissioners 
on Uniform State Laws to promulgate the Restatement approach as 
a uniform act. As we have noted elsewhere, uniform acts dealing with 
real estate or mortgage law have been only rarely and sporadically 
adopted by state legislatures.197 
The future of the Restatement subrogation rule and related 
doctrines may lie with Congress. It is a well-understood fact that the 
residential mortgage market in the United States is a national 
market, and that its efficiency is inevitably impaired to some extent 
by varying state rules of law.198 It is for that reason that we recently 
advocated the adoption by Congress of the Uniform Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure Act, promulgated in 2002 by the National Conference 
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.199 We concluded that the 
national adoption of a uniform nonjudicial foreclosure procedure was 
justified as a constitutional and policy matter, given “the enormous 
impact of mortgage financing on the national economy and the 
dramatic growth of the secondary market for mortgages. . . .”200 
If anything, the proposal here is more modest. There we 
advocated the congressional preemption of state foreclosure 
procedure in those states that already utilize some version of 
nonjudicial foreclosure, and the imposition of that type of 
foreclosure remedy on the states—nearly half of the nation—where 
only judicial foreclosure is currently permitted. This would 
admittedly be a radical move, displacing a large body of state law in a 
large number of states. 
 
 197. Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The Uniform 
Nonjudicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1408–09, 1509 (2004); Ronald Benton 
Brown, Whatever Happened to the Uniform Land Transactions Act?, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1017, 
1017–18 (1996). 
 198. See Peter M. Carrozzo, Marketing the American Mortgage: The Emergency Home 
Finance Act of 1970, Standardization and the Secondary Market Revolution, 39 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 765, 787 (2005); Robin Paul Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market—A 
Catalyst for Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 SW. L.J. 991, 996–97 (1986); James E. 
McNulty, Secondary Mortgage Markets: Recent Trends and Research Results, FED. HOME LOAN 
BANK BOARD J., Apr. 1984, at 10, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ 
mi_m6201/is_n3_17/ai_3209769. The national focus of the mortgage market is illustrated by 
the extremely heavy involvement of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in acquiring home 
mortgages. See supra note 193. 
 199. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 197, at 1509–13. 
 200. Id. at 1509. 
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The proposal here is more analogous to congressional enactment 
of the Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (the 
“Garn Act”), which made mortgage due-on-sale clauses enforceable 
as a matter of preemptive federal law.201 Prior to that enactment, 
there was great uncertainty under many state statutes and judicial 
decisions concerning the enforceability of “due-on-sale” provisions 
in mortgages. Congress was motivated largely by desire to aid a 
then-struggling savings and loan industry. In a sense, the 
subrogation proposal presented here, like the Garn Act, deals with a 
relatively narrow substantive rule rather than a wholesale change in 
foreclosure practice. Like the Garn Act, this proposal, if enacted, 
could very well save billions of dollars annually—but for refinancing 
homeowners, not lenders. 
Moreover, congressional enactment is entirely feasible from a 
political standpoint. While the title insurance industry might oppose 
the concept on the ground that it would sustain a loss of revenue in 
refinancing transactions, the mortgage lending industry would have a 
strong incentive to support it in order to reduce overall costs to 
refinancing borrowers. It is quite realistic to expect Congress to act. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
This Article advocates adoption of a package of proposals to 
reform the law of mortgage refinancing with the Restatement’s 
approach to the doctrine of subrogation as its centerpiece. We have 
demonstrated that title insurance costs in residential mortgage 
refinancings represent billions of dollars annually—costs that are now 
borne overwhelmingly by homeowners. We have illustrated how 
adoption of the Restatement sections dealing with subrogation and 
related priority issues would virtually eliminate the risk of loss of 
mortgage priority for refinancing lenders. We have also described 
how two simple additions to mortgage documents would serve to 
enhance this protection by strongly increasing the likelihood that 
courts would apply the subrogation doctrine and would grant 
priority to refinancing lenders even when the new mortgage exceeds 
the amount of its predecessor. These latter steps could largely be 
 
 201. This mortgage clause authorizes a lender to accelerate the obligation and foreclose if 
the real estate is transferred without the lender’s written permission. See Grant S. Nelson & 
Dale A. Whitman, Congressional Preemption of Mortgage Due-on-Sale Law: An Analysis of the 
Garn-St. Germain Act, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 241, 251 (1983). 
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accomplished by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac incorporating the 
appropriate language in their standard residential mortgage forms. 
We also considered the technique of direct assignment to new 
lenders of mortgages being refinanced as an alternative to 
subrogation, but concluded that the adoption of such an approach 
would be impractical at this time. 
Ultimately, the Restatement approach should be enacted by 
Congress. Such federal legislation, buttressed by the two drafting 
techniques described above, would represent a package of 
protections for lenders that would largely obviate the major reason 
for title insurance in refinancing transactions. In such an 
environment, we believe that title insurers would either substantially 
reduce premiums in home mortgage refinancings or run the risk that 
major institutional lenders would eliminate the need for title 
insurance completely by becoming self-insurers. Either way, 
American homeowners would be the major beneficiaries. 
The potential savings quite literally amount to billions of dollars. 
Whether the change is accomplished by Congress or by the 
incremental process of state adoption, it is vital that it occur before 
the next major decline in mortgage interest rates and the 
corresponding wave of mortgage financings. Economic efficiency in 
the marketplace, and the attendant savings for individual households, 
demands nothing less. 
 
